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Abstract: The 2016 Supreme Court decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo revived the use of “representative” or sampling evidence in class
actions. Federal courts are now more receptive to class plaintiffs’ efforts to
prove classwide liability and, occasionally, aggregate damages, with sampling
evidence. However, federal courts still routinely deny motions for class
certification because they find that calculations of class members’ individual
damages defeat the predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3). As a result,
meritorious classwide claims founder. In this paper, we combine legal and
statistical analyses and propose a novel solution to this dilemma that adheres to
the Tyson decision while satisfying Daubert, the standards of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, and the prerequisites for Rule 23(b)(3) classes. We develop a
method and derive a threshold to determine whether class damages claims are
sufficiently homogeneous to justify the admissibility of sampling evidence to
prove individual damages. Relying on Daubert and its progeny, as well as other
well-recognized authority, we argue that accuracy is an appropriate standard for
evidentiary reliability. Then, using generally accepted statistical methods and
standards, we show that, when judgment variability exceeds claim variability
(terms we define), sampling evidence improves accuracy and evidentiary
reliability and is, therefore, admissible in Rule 23(b)(3) class certification
proceedings. We also recommend several procedures to evaluate whether
damages claims of a putative class satisfy the derived threshold. We conclude
that our proposed method to prove individual damages achieves the Supreme
Court’s stated goals of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, “economies of time, effort,
and expense” and the promotion of “uniformity of decision as to persons
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about
other undesirable results.”
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs moving for class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must demonstrate, among other things, that
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members.” 1 To establish predominance,
plaintiffs must show that common classwide proof can resolve one or more
liability or damages issues, and that individual inquiries—those necessitating
the introduction of evidence that varies from member to member—are not
qualitatively more significant than common issues. Putative class plaintiffs
have proposed methods to prove classwide liability or damages by proffering
sampling evidence, contending that common questions predominate over
individual questions notwithstanding the existence of differences among class
members’ claims. They have argued that it is appropriate to extrapolate from
adjudications of a representative sample of class members’ claims to
determine classwide liability or to calculate classwide damages. However,
federal courts have rarely accepted these arguments.
In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the United States Supreme
Court rejected as “Trial by Formula” a proposal to extrapolate classwide
liability and damages based on a small sample of claims selected for
individual adjudications.2 Two years later, in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, after
confirming that federal district courts must perform a “rigorous analysis” to
test whether plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
standard, the Court arguably raised the evidentiary bar when it reversed a
class certification order.3 The Court held that the Third Circuit committed
reversible error by refusing to consider whether a proposed statistical model
was capable of proving classwide damages. 4 Wal-Mart and Comcast were
generally viewed as the death knell for sampling evidence in class actions. 5
In 2016, however, in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, the Court
approved the admissibility of “representative evidence” to prove classwide
liability. 6 More specifically, it held that “[o]ne way for [class plaintiffs] to
1

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011).
3
569 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2013).
4
Id.
5
Comcast can be read to suggest that predominance is not satisfied unless damages can be
determined on a classwide basis. See id. at 34. However, most courts do not interpret Comcast so
broadly, finding predominance of other common issues, even if individual damages calculations
are necessary. See, e.g., Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 375 (3d Cir. 2015);
Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739
F.3d 790, 815 (5th Cir. 2014); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig.,
722 F.3d 838, 859–60 (6th Cir. 2013); Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 513–14 (9th
Cir. 2013). In any event, it is now settled that solely the need to calculate individual damages will
not defeat certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. See infra notes 178–181 and accompanying text.
6
136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016).
2
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show . . . that the sample relied upon . . . is a permissible method of proving
classwide liability is by showing that each class member could have relied on
that sample to establish liability if he or she had brought an individual
action.”7 The Court explained that the admissibility of “representative
evidence” turns on its relevance and, most importantly, its reliability. 8
Tyson may usher in a revival of sampling evidence in class action
litigation.9 After Tyson, class plaintiffs are increasingly offering
“representative evidence,” including sampling evidence, as a method to prove
classwide liability to satisfy the predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3).
But the permissibility of sampling evidence to prove classwide damages—
and especially individual damages—remains uncertain and controversial.
Frequently, when a putative Rule 23(b)(3) class asserts individual damages
claims, federal district courts decide to certify a class to determine classwide
liability issues, and perhaps even aggregate damages issues, but reserve the
calculations of individual class members’ damages for separate adjudications.
Even more often, if the calculations of individual damages cannot be
computed formulaically, federal district courts find that individual issues
predominate over common issues, and refuse to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class.
In this Article, we argue that, in appropriate circumstances, sampling
evidence is admissible to meet the predominance standard and as a method to
prove individual damages when plaintiffs move for class certification
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). We answer a threshold question: When does
sampling evidence, offered to prove individual damages in a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action, pass muster under governing evidentiary standards? We explain
that, whether sampling evidence is admissible, and whether a federal district
court will certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class based on such evidence, depend on the
relevance and reliability of the proffered evidence. We explore the
circumstances under which sampling evidence establishing individual
damages satisfies these governing evidentiary standards.
After this brief introduction, in Part I, as historical background, we
discuss the demise and revival of sampling evidence in federal court class
actions. In Part II, we analyze the evidentiary law governing the admissibility
of expert evidence in class certification disputes. In Part III, we examine the
Rule 23(b)(3) class-action prerequisites of commonality, predominance, and
superiority, with a focus on predominance. We also summarize the
circumstances under which federal district courts have generally found that,
in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, common issues predominate over individual
issues, notwithstanding variable individual damages. We next discuss the
7

Id. at 1046–47.
Id. at 1046.
9
See Jonah B. Gelbach, The Triangle of Law and the Role of Evidence in Class Action
Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1807, 1845 (2017) (“Still, Tyson may be a big case. It may herald a
more pragmatic approach in Supreme Court assessments of class certification.”).
8
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admissibility of expert evidence, and sampling evidence in particular, to
prove individual damages in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. In Part IV, we
propose a statistical method to support the introduction of sampling evidence
during class certification proceedings that satisfies Daubert, Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 standards that govern the admissibility of expert evidence, and
the predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3). We develop a method and
derive a threshold to determine whether class damages claims are sufficiently
homogeneous to justify the admissibility of sampling evidence to prove
individual damages. We argue that accuracy is an appropriate standard for
evidentiary reliability and show that, when judgment variability exceeds
claim variability (terms we define), sampling evidence improves accuracy
and evidentiary reliability, and is admissible. Finally, we conclude that our
proposed method to prove individual damages achieves the Supreme Court’s
stated goals for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, “economies of time, effort, and
expense” and the promotion of “uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other
undesirable results.”10
I. DEMISE AND REVIVAL OF SAMPLING EVIDENCE
IN FEDERAL COURT CLASS ACTIONS
After the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, several commentators declared that the use of statistical evidence to
prove liability or damages in class actions was dead or, at best, moribund. 11 In
2016, however, in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, the Court clarified that:
“Wal-Mart does not stand for the broad proposition that a representative
sample is an impermissible means of establishing classwide liability.” 12 Thus,
to paraphrase Mark Twain, the reports of the death of statistical evidence in
class actions proved to be an exaggeration. The Tyson Court proclaimed:
“Whether and when statistical evidence can be used to establish classwide
liability will depend on the purpose for which the evidence is being

10
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615, 634 (1997) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment).
11
See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Resurrecting Trial by Statistics, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1459, 1459 (2015)
(“[T]rial by statistics died on June 20, 2011 [date of Wal-Mart decision]. . . . The notion that a court
could try a representative sample of monetary claims and extrapolate the average result to the
remainder of the cases was finished.”); Wenbo Whang, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo: The Use of
Statistical Evidence in Class Actions, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 133, 133 (2016),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1130&context=djclpp_sidebar
[https://perma.cc/R758-NXS6] (“[T]he Supreme Court has largely foreclosed arguments for trial by
statistics in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes.”). But see, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245,
1257 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that “Wal-Mart does not prohibit [class] certification based on the use
of extrapolation to calculate damages”).
12
Tyson,136 S. Ct. at 1048.
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introduced and on ‘the elements of the underlying cause of action.’”13 With
that dicta, the Court resisted the urgings of the Tyson parties and their
respective amici to adopt “broad and categorical rules governing the use of
representative and statistical evidence in class actions.” 14 As the Court
explained:
13
Id. at 1046 (quoting Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809 (2011)).
The Tyson Court did not elucidate what it meant by “the purpose for which the [statistical]
evidence is being introduced.” The results of sampling are often admitted into evidence in various
legal contexts. See, e.g., 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 479, 483–86 (2015–16 ed.) (discussing uses of sampling
surveys in cases involving, among others, employment discrimination, juror bias, obscenity, and
trademark litigation); 2 JOSEPH L. GASTWIRTH, STATISTICAL REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY 483–528 (1988) (discussing uses of sampling in cases involving, among others, false
labeling and gender-based equal protection). By way of examples only, statistical evidence, and
more particularly sampling evidence, is frequently introduced to prove “likelihood of confusion”
in trademark infringement cases, see 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 23:1–23:11.50 (4th ed. 2010); “disparate impact” in Title VII (42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1–2000e-17) cases, see GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 79–89 (3d ed. 2010); and antitrust
damages, see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 116 & n.11
(1969). See generally Joseph B. Kadane, Probability Sampling in Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J.
297, 299–303 (2011). As one commentator suggested, “broadly interpreted,” Tyson “stands for the
proposition that sampling can be used to overcome any serious proof obstacle that systematically
deprives a large number of injured parties of compensation, impedes enforcement of the
substantive law, and leaves the defendant free to retain the benefits of its unlawful conduct—
provided, of course, that sampling is otherwise consistent with the applicable substantive law.”
Robert Bone, Tyson Foods and the Future of Statistical Adjudication, 95 N.C. L. REV. 607, 636
(2017).
The Tyson Court also did not explain its quotation from Erica P. John Fund—“the elements
of the underlying cause of action.” The sole dispute in Erica P. John Fund was whether plaintiff
satisfied the predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3). The Court stated “[c]onsidering”
predominance “begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of action.” Erica P.
John Fund, 563 U.S. at 809. There, plaintiff’s claims were based on alleged violations of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5). Id. at 809–10. Whether common questions of
law or fact predominated turned on, as it often does in securities fraud actions, the element of
reliance. The narrow question presented for review by the Supreme Court was whether plaintiff
needed to establish “loss causation as a precondition for invoking Basic’s [“fraud-on-the-market”]
rebuttable presumption of reliance.” Id. at 812; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit erred in requiring plaintiff to make this showing as
a precondition of class certification. Erica P. John Fund, 563 U.S. at 813. In short, the Court ruled
that an inability to prove “loss causation” does not prevent a plaintiff from invoking the “fraud-onthe-market” rebuttable presumption of reliance as evidence to satisfy that “element[] of the
underlying cause of action.” Id. at 809. Taken together, Tyson and Erica P. John Fund teach that
introducing statistical evidence to prove one or more elements of class claims will not only
support the admissibility of that evidence, but also undergird the satisfaction of the predominance
prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3).
14
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1040. The death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016,
undoubtedly influences the jurisprudence of the current sharply-divided Supreme Court. Justice
Scalia heard oral argument in Tyson on November 10, 2015, but died before the opinion was
issued on March 22, 2016. He was an avowed proponent of curtailing class actions, as evidenced
by his authorship of the majority opinions in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), Wal-
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A representative or statistical sample, like all evidence, is a means
to establish or defend against liability. Its permissibility turns not
on the form a proceeding takes—be it a class or individual action—
but on the degree to which the evidence is reliable in proving or
disproving the elements of the relevant cause of action.15
A comparison of Wal-Mart and Tyson illuminates the superficial
inconsistency of the Court’s two decisions. However, in Tyson, the Court
attempted to harmonize them.
A. Wal-Mart v. Dukes
The “crux” of the Wal-Mart case is “commonality.” 16 The Wal-Mart
Court found that the only corporate policy established by plaintiffs’ evidence
was “Wal-Mart’s ‘policy’ of allowing discretion by local supervisors over
employment matters. . . . just the opposite of a uniform employment practice
that would provide the commonality needed for a class action . . . .” 17
In Wal-Mart, a majority of the Court rejected regression analyses
performed by plaintiffs’ expert statistician and expert labor economist. It
found that the regional and national data used by the experts “does not
establish the existence of disparities at individual stores, let alone raise the
inference that a company-wide policy of discrimination is implemented by
discretionary decisions at the store and district level.” 18 The Wal-Mart Court
also identified a “more fundamental . . . respect in which [plaintiffs’]
statistical proof fails.”19 It found that the “nature and effects” of Wal-Mart
managers’ applying “performance-based criteria . . . will differ from store to
store,” and ruled that “[m]erely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion
has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice.”20
Plaintiffs in Wal-Mart proposed to select a sample set of class members
and to determine liability and damages for those members by depositions
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333 (2011).
15
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (citing FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 702). As will be discussed,
reliability is paramount when considering the admissibility of “[a] representative or statistical
sample.” See infra note 190 and accompanying text and Part IV.
16
564 U.S. at 349; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (“[T]here are questions of law or fact common
to the class . . . .”).
17
564 U.S. at 355.
18
Id. at 356–57 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 637 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Ikuta, J., dissenting), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)).
19
Id. at 357.
20
Id. The four dissenting justices in Wal-Mart (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.)
contended that plaintiffs’ expert statistician’s regression analyses showed that there were
disparities within stores, not just at the regional and national level, and that the majority’s contrary
view “reflect[ed] only an arcane disagreement about statistical method.” Id. at 372 n.5 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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supervised by a master. 21 Under their proposal, classwide aggregate damages
would be derived by taking the “percentage of claims determined to be valid”
from the sample and applying that percentage to non-sample class members,
and then multiplying the “number of (presumptively) valid claims” by the
average damages in the sample. 22 The Wal-Mart Court found that plaintiffs’
proposed statistical evidence would not tend to prove classwide claims and
held that this “Trial by Formula” violated the Rules Enabling Act because it
“enlarge[d]” the class members’ “substantive right[s]” and deprived Wal-Mart
of its right to raise statutory defenses to individual claims. 23
21

564 U.S. at 367.
Id.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)). Responses to arguments against the use of
statistical evidence in class actions based on the Rules Enabling Act, Article III (federal court
authority), Seventh Amendment (jury trial right and Reexamination Clause), and Fourteenth
Amendment (Due Process Clause) are beyond the scope of this article. U.S. CONST. art. III,
amend. VII, XIV; 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
On April 4, 2016, two weeks after its Tyson decision, the Supreme Court denied a petition for
a writ of certiorari to review a $188 million class action judgment against Wal-Mart in a
Pennsylvania wage and hour case. Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 106 A.3d 656, 658 (Pa. 2014),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1512 (2016) (mem.). In that state court trial, plaintiffs’ experts
extrapolated sample evidence to calculate classwide aggregate damages. Id. at 661–62. Despite
Wal-Mart’s contention that this “Trial by Formula” violated its constitutional rights and was
proscribed by Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court declined to review the case without comment. Id. at
663–67.
After Wal-Mart, several federal courts latched on to the “Trial by Formula” rubric and
disapproved sampling methodologies to prove classwide liability or damages. See, e.g., Jimenez v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming bifurcated class action order
because “statistical sampling and representative testimony are acceptable ways to determine
liability so long as the use of these techniques is not expanded into the realm of damages”); Davis
v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2013) (characterizing sampling method used as
“worse than the system that the Supreme Court unanimously rejected in” Wal-Mart and rejecting
“‘shortfall-based’ model” to order hiring of randomly selected class members and to calculate
aggregate damages that would be distributed to eligible class members pro rata); In re Elec. Books
Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2293-DLC, 2014 WL 1282293, at *22–23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014)
(describing Wal-Mart “Trial by Formula” as “a plan to try a sample set of class members’
claims . . . and then multiply the average backpay award to determine the class-wide recovery
without further individualized proceedings”); Slipchenko v. Brunel Energy, Inc., No. H-11-1465LHR, 2013 WL 4677918, at *10 n.8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2013) (distinguishing Wal-Mart “Trial
by Formula” because plaintiffs did “not propose[] a sampling-based method to determine
penalties”); Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578, 588–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (bifurcating
liability and damages issues and partially decertifying damages issues of Rule 23(b)(3) class due
to sampling concerns); Acosta v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 8:08 CV 86-JFB, 2013 WL 7849473, at
*18 (D. Neb. May 31, 2013) (“Although a ‘trial by formula,’ wherein damages are determined for
a sample set of class members and then applied by extrapolation to the rest of the class ‘without
further individualized proceedings,’ has been disapproved, that disapproval cannot fairly be
interpreted to apply to the use of representative testimony in a class action for unpaid wages.”
(quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367)), order clarified 2013 WL 3716445 (July 12, 2013); George
v. Nat’l Water Main Cleaning Co., 286 F.R.D. 168, 181–82 (D. Mass. 2012) (contrasting “Trial by
Formula” because plaintiffs alleged defendant’s “wage policies facially violated state law” and
remedy only “involves reconstructing the correct wage algorithm,” and noting “defendants are
entitled to any additional proceedings required to ensure that their due process rights are
protected” (citations omitted)); Stone v. Advance Am., 278 F.R.D. 562, 566 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 2011)
22
23
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At bottom, the putative Wal-Mart class failed to meet the commonality
prerequisite of Rule 23(a)(2) because plaintiffs did not prove that each class
member was subjected to a common policy of discrimination.24
B. Tyson v. Bouaphakeo
In Tyson, plaintiffs relied on “representative evidence,” including class
members’ testimony, videotaped observations of certain employees’ activities,
and “most important, a study performed by an industrial relations expert.” 25
Based on the videotaped observations, plaintiffs’ industrial relations expert
calculated average times for the observed employees to perform the disputed
activities, “donning” and “doffing” safety gear. 26 Another plaintiffs’ expert
extrapolated those averages to all class members and, by using Tyson
company time records, estimated the number of class members who had
viable claims (that is, those who worked more than forty hours in one or more
(stating that Wal-Mart “largely eliminates a ‘trial by formula’ approach to use statistics to
extrapolate average damages for an entire class”); United States v. City of New York, 276 F.R.D.
22, 38–39 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting methodology for distributing aggregate damages
because it “resembles the method the Supreme Court termed ‘Trial by Formula’”).
At least one Circuit Court has arguably narrowed the scope of Wal-Mart. See Jimenez, 765
F.3d at 1167. In Jimenez, the Ninth Circuit opined that the Wal-Mart Court “relied on two key
factors,” namely that the holding was made “under Rule 23(b)(2), which contains fewer
procedural safeguards than Rule 23(b)(3) [e.g., opt-out],” and Title VII “which explicitly includes
affirmative defenses relating to motive and alternative explanations.” Id. The Ninth Circuit
suggested that these “two key factors” limit the Wal-Mart holding. See id.
24
564 U.S. at 359. The conventional wisdom is that Wal-Mart makes it more difficult to
satisfy the commonality prerequisite of Rule 23(a)(2). See, e.g., Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d
895, 903 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting “Wal-Mart’s heightened requirement of commonality”); M.D. ex
rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Wal-Mart decision has
heightened the standards for establishing commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) . . . .”); Christine P.
Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class Actions, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 743, 772
(2015) (stating that Wal-Mart “heightened the [commonality] requirement”); Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855, 1863–64 (2015) (“Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes strengthened the commonality standard under Rule 23(a) . . . .”). Class certification
orders filed after Tyson appear to confirm the conventional wisdom. See, e.g., Dilts v. Penske
Logistics, LLC, No. 08-CV-0318-CAB-BLM, 2016 WL 4072485, at *3–6 & n.1 (S.D. Cal. July
20, 2016) (decertifying certain subclasses and rejecting plaintiff’s proposal to call forty random
absent class members to testify at trial and to extrapolate from that testimony); Brown v. United
States, 126 Fed. Cl. 571, 580–81 (2016).
25
136 S. Ct. at 1043. Plaintiffs’ claims were based on alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (“FLSA”).
“Representative evidence” and “representative testimony” are terms of art in FLSA actions that
refer to evidence regarding selected employees that support findings for all “similarly situated”
employees. See, e.g., Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 815 F.3d 1000, 1018, 1020–22 (6th Cir. 2016),
cert. granted, vacated, 137 S. Ct. 590 (2016) (judgment vacated, and case remanded “in light of”
Tyson). Cf. Espenscheid v. DirectStat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding no
“representative evidence”).
26
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1043. Pre-Tyson, class plaintiffs relied on similar studies in Garcia v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 770 F.3d 1300, 1306–07 (10th Cir. 2014), and Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc.,
650 F.3d 350, 370–72 (4th Cir. 2011).
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weeks) and the aggregate amount of class damages. 27 That expert’s
“calculations supported an aggregate [damages] award of approximately $6.7
million.” 28 The jury awarded about $2.9 million in damages. 29
27

Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1043–44.
Id. at 1044. The Tyson Court noted that Tyson “did not raise a challenge to [plaintiffs’]
experts’ methodology under Daubert; and, as a result, there is no basis in the record to conclude it
was legal error to admit that evidence.” Id. at 1049. The Court emphasized that, once admitted, the
“persuasiveness” of evidence “is, in general, a matter for the jury” and “[r]esolving” whether
plaintiffs’ industrial relations expert’s average times “is probative as to the time actually worked
by each employee” “is the near-exclusive province of the jury.” Id.
It is curious that Tyson neither challenged the validity of plaintiffs’ experts’ studies under
Daubert nor introduced rebuttal expert testimony, id. at 1044, 1049, despite the fact that it listed
an expert witness that it expected to call at trial, Def.’s Mem. Supporting Exclusion of Any
Reference to Dr. Paul Adams, or His Ops., at Trial at 2–3, Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564
F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Iowa 2008). Tyson’s “primary defense was to show that [plaintiffs’
industrial relations expert’s] study was unrepresentative or inaccurate.” Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1047.
In opposing class certification and to the jury, Tyson argued, unsuccessfully, that plaintiffs’
expert’s calculated average times were overstated and that the varying amounts of time that the
observed employees performed the disputed activities made the claims “too speculative for
classwide recovery.” Id. at 1044, 1047; see Andrew J. Trask, Litigation Matters: The Curious
Case of Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, 2016 CATO S. CT. REV. 279. The fact that Tyson did not
object to plaintiffs’ expert evidence precluded Tyson from arguing that it was not admissible, but
it did not prevent Tyson from arguing that the “evidence failed ‘to show that the case is
susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.’” Comcast, 569 U.S. at 32 n.4 (quoting
question presented for review in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 567 U.S. 933 (2012)).
29
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1044. At Tyson’s request, the jury was instructed that non-testifying
class members could recover only if the evidence established that they “suffered the same harm as
a result of the same unlawful decision or policy” as the testifying class members. Id. (citing J.A. at
101, 471–72, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (Aug. 7, 2015)). The trial court also
adopted Tyson’s proposed jury verdict form calling for an aggregate damages award. Brief for
Respondents at 20, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (Sept. 22, 2015).
Tyson originally argued that class certification was proper only if plaintiffs established that
all putative class members had valid claims, but it abandoned that argument in favor of a narrower
challenge to the distribution of the aggregate damages awarded by the jury. Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at
1049. The Tyson Court did not address damages issues. However, in his concurring opinion, Chief
Justice John Roberts stated that, based on the jury’s damages award, the “jury obviously did not
credit [plaintiffs’ industrial relations expert’s] averages” and he stated further that he is “not
convinced that the District Court will be able to devise a means of distributing the aggregate
award only to injured class members.” Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1051 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see
id. at 1044 (demonstrating that it was undisputed that over 200 class members did not have valid
claims). If not, according to Chief Justice Roberts, “it remains to be seen whether the jury verdict
can stand” because “Article III does not give federal courts the power to order relief to any
uninjured plaintiff, class action or not.” Id. at 1053.
After remand, in an October 6, 2016, Order regarding the distribution of classwide aggregate
damages, the trial court noted that the Tyson “parties agreed to . . . ‘filters’ in order to ensure
uninjured individuals do not receive any of the jury’s aggregate award.” Bouaphakeo v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009-JAJ, 2016 WL 5868081, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 6, 2016). First,
workers who did not “reach 40 hours in a week without the aid of” plaintiffs’ industrial relations
expert’s “donning” and “doffing” times estimates were “excluded from the award.” Id. Second,
only workers who are “owed at least $50” after adding those estimates will share in the award. Id.
According to the trial court, this “‘buffer zone’ further ensures that uninjured individuals will not
receive damages by withholding damages from lesser-injured parties.” Id. As a result, 199 workers
“are not uninjured, rather, they are exempt from the award by agreement of the parties.” Id.
28
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The Tyson Court ruled that one way to show that a sample is a
“permissible method of proving classwide liability is by showing that each
class member could have relied on that sample to establish liability . . . [in] an
individual action.”30 The Court concluded that plaintiffs’ expert’s study was
admissible and “could have been sufficient to sustain a jury finding . . . if it
were introduced in each employee’s individual action.” 31 Moreover, as the
Court pointed out, “[i]n many cases, a representative sample is ‘the only
practicable means to collect and present relevant data’ establishing a
defendant’s liability.” 32
“Finally, by choosing to award any damages in light of the jury instructions regarding
compensation of uninjured parties, the jury reinforced the ‘injured’ status of the class members.”
Id.
On July 11, 2017, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Settlement of All Contested Issues
Between the Parties and Joint Request to Vacate Current Court Deadlines for Plaintiffs to File
Supplements to Their Petition for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs, by which the parties
notified the trial court that, among other things, they had “establish[ed] a process involving a
third-party settlement administrator, . . . , to disburse all payments to the Class Members from the
aggregate jury award in a manner consistent with this Court’s Order of October 6, 2016.”
Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07–cv–04009–JAJ (N.D. Iowa July 11, 2017), ECF No.
432.
30
136 S. Ct at 1046. The Court unanimously shared this view; see also id. at 1050 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring); id. at 1053 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Cf. Davenport v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC,
Case No. 4:12 CV 00007 AGF, 2017 WL 878029, at *8–9 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2017) (finding a
“lack of evidence of a common policy” and therefore “little role for representative evidence”);
Angeles v. US Airways, Inc., No. C 12 -05860 CRB, 2017 WL 587658, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13,
2017) (“Representative evidence would not fly for individual [class members] and it will not fly
for a class of them.”).
31
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1048.
32
Id. at 1046 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.493, at 102 (2004)).
The 2015 edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation expands on this point: “Statistical methods
can often estimate, to specified levels of accuracy, the characteristics of a ‘population’ . . . by
observing those characteristics in a relatively small segment, or sample, of the population.”
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.493, at 102 (2015). In the Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence published by the Federal Judicial Center, the Reference Guide on Statistics
begins: “Statistical assessments are prominent in many kinds of legal cases, including antitrust,
employment discrimination, toxic torts, and voting rights cases.” David H. Kaye & David A.
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211,
213 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Reference Guide on Statistics].
As the Brief of Amici Curiae Complex Litigation Law Professors in Tyson highlighted:
“Statistical techniques and similar approaches that rely upon a sample are an appropriate way to
determine common issues of liability in a variety of settings, including antitrust, securities fraud,
and employment discrimination litigation. In all of these settings statistical techniques have been
especially useful at the class certification stage to determine whether the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) has been satisfied.” Brief for Complex Litigation Law Professors as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4–5, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146
(Sept. 29, 2015) (citing, inter alia, Comcast, 569 U.S. at 31–32) (antitrust); Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (securities fraud); Messner v. Northshore
Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2012) (antitrust); In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2008) (antitrust); Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 300
(5th Cir. 2000) (employment discrimination); Barnes v. GenCorp. Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1466 (6th
Cir. 1990) (employment discrimination)); see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH)

666

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 59:655

In Tyson, the “central dispute” was whether the “average time” observed
in the sample could be extrapolated to each member of the population was a
“permissible” “inference.”33 For this reason, the Court opined that its Tyson
holding “is in accord with” Wal-Mart because the “underlying question” in
both cases “was whether the sample at issue could have been used to establish
liability in an individual action.” 34
§ 23.1, at 469–72 (2004); 6 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 18:45, at 155–56 (5th ed. 2012).
33
136 S. Ct. at 1046. The Brief of Economists and Other Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents in Tyson offered this overview:
Inferential statistics, . . . comprises methods that allow us to use what is known to
make estimates and predictions about the unknown. All inferential techniques in
statistics are, in one way or another, based on well-accepted concepts of sampling
and extrapolation. Sampling refers to the idea that observed information is an
incomplete, grainy snapshot—a sample—taken from a larger universe of potentially
observable information, called the population. Extrapolation means that this sample,
although incomplete, can still be reliably informative about the population from
which it is obtained. . . .
Good statistical practice calls for data collection procedures that minimize the
risk of unrepresentative sampling, analytical tools appropriate to deal with a given
sample, and trained interpretation that recognizes the potential limitations of both
data and techniques.
Brief of Economists and Other Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7–
8, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (Sept. 29, 2015).
Among other grounds for criticizing plaintiffs’ experts’ statistical evidence in Tyson, Justice
Clarence Thomas in dissent objected to the sample size, “about 53,” that was used “to extrapolate
averages for the 3,344-person class.” Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1055 (Thomas, J., dissenting). While
discussing Wal-Mart, Justice Thomas alluded to the “1:8 ratio of anecdotes [samples] to class
members that our prior cases accepted.” Id. at 1060 (citing Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 358); see also
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977).
34
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1048. Some courts and commentators believe that the Tyson Court’s
decision to accept “representative evidence” can be explained by, and therefore should be limited
to, its substantive law context. As previously noted, in Tyson, plaintiffs’ claims were based on
alleged violations of the FLSA. See supra note 25. The FLSA requires employers, such as Tyson,
to “make, keep, and preserve” employee wage and hour records. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2012). More
than seventy years ago, the Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680
(1946), held that when an employer violates its FLSA statutory duty to keep proper records, and
employees thereby have no way to establish the time spent doing uncompensated work, “an
employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he
was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and
extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Id. at 687. “The burden then
shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or
with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee’s
evidence.” Id. at 687–88. Following and applying the evidentiary burden-shifting procedure
approved in Mt. Clemens, the Tyson Court found that plaintiffs “sought to introduce a
representative sample to fill an evidentiary gap created by [Tyson’s] failure to keep adequate
records.” Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. “Courts have frequently granted back wages under the FLSA
to non-testifying employees based upon the representative testimony of a small percentage of the
employees.” Donavan v. Bel-Loc Diner, Inc., 780 F.2d 1113, 1116 (4th Cir. 1985), abrogated on
other grounds by McLaughlin v. Richard Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988); see Morgan v. Family
Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases); cf. Day v. Celadon
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Plaintiffs in both Wal-Mart and Tyson proposed to use sampling
evidence to prove classwide liability and damages, but both Supreme Court
decisions were limited to classwide liability issues. Because the aggregate
damages awarded at the Tyson trial had not been disbursed, and the record at
the Supreme Court did not indicate how they would be disbursed, the Tyson
Court deemed any consideration of damages issues premature. 35 Thus, the
Supreme Court did not in Tyson, and has not to date, provided any specific
guidance regarding the permissible use of sampling evidence to prove
aggregate damages or individual damages in class actions. 36
C. Harmonizing Wal-Mart and Tyson
At first blush, it is difficult to reconcile the Wal-Mart and Tyson
decisions. The salient facts are similar. In both cases, the putative class
members’ damages claims were too small to make separate adjudications
feasible (“negative value cases”), and therefore the only realistic way for
them to obtain relief was through a class action (or other aggregation
procedure). In both cases, plaintiffs offered a sample average to determine
aggregate damages.
The Tyson Court distinguished Wal-Mart by contrasting the
heterogeneity of the two proposed classes: “While the experiences of the
employees in Wal-Mart bore little relationship to one another, in this [Tyson]
case each employee worked in the same facility, did similar work, and was
paid under the same policy.” 37 The Tyson Court characterized the “underlying
question” in both cases as “whether the sample at issue could have been used
Trucking Servs., Inc., No. 15-1711, 2016 WL 3606682, at *8 (8th Cir. July 5, 2016) (applying Mt.
Clemens evidentiary burden-shifting procedure in a Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification (“WARN”) Act case). Compare Atis v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 15-3424-RBKJS, 2016 WL 7440465, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 27, 2016) (finding Tyson inapposite because the
employer “had no statutory duty to track the hours worked” by exempt employees), with
Ridgeway v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-cv-05221-SI, 2017 WL 363214, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
25, 2017) (stating a jury accepting “representative sampling [figures] used to reach an average
amount of time spent on a certain activity was approved by the Supreme Court in Tyson”).
Justice Thomas reads Mt. Clemens even more narrowly, concluding that “[a]ll Mt. Clemens
decided was that the lack of precise data about the amount of time each employee worked was not
fatal to their case,” and that its holding is limited “to instances where the employer’s FLSA
violation was ‘certain.’” 136 S. Ct. at 1057–59 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Mt. Clemens, 328
U.S. at 688).
35
136 S. Ct. at 1049–50; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
36
See Bone, supra note 13, at 632 (opining that Tyson “opens the door to broader use of
sampling but provides little guidance to lower court judges, who must decide when and how to use
it”); Note, Civil Procedure—Representative Evidence—Tyson Foods Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 130
HARV. L. REV. 407, 411 (2016) (“Though the Court reached a sound conclusion on the
admissibility question, it failed to guide trial judges on how to handle representative studies going
forward.”); id. at 416 (“Trial judges would have benefited from some discussion of managing
statistical evidence when it is admissible.”).
37
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1048; see Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359.
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to establish liability in an individual action,” and, because the Wal-Mart
putative class members were not “similarly situated,” the Court stated that
there “would be little or no role for representative evidence” in any individual
adjudication in that case. 38 The Tyson Court concluded: “Permitting the use of
that sample in a class action, therefore, would have violated the Rules
Enabling Act by giving plaintiffs and defendants different rights in a class
proceeding than they could have asserted in an individual action.”39 In short,
plaintiffs’ sampling evidence was rejected in Wal-Mart because “the sample
chosen was [not] representative of [the] population.”40
As the Wal-Mart Court itself stated, the “crux” of the Wal-Mart case is
“commonality,” that is, whether each class member suffered from a common
corporate policy of discrimination.41 It is therefore a stretch to intimate that
the “underlying question” in that case “was whether the sample at issue could
have been used to establish liability in an individual action.” 42
However, Wal-Mart and Tyson can be harmonized. The principal
learning of Wal-Mart, as interpreted by the Tyson Court, is that the
admissibility of sampling evidence, “like all evidence,” “turns . . . on the
degree to which the evidence is reliable in proving or disproving the elements
of the relevant cause of action.”43 Thus, there is no reason why reliable
sampling evidence may not be introduced to prove both classwide liability
and classwide damages, including individual damages.
In this Article, we focus on proving the element of classwide damages,
and more particularly class members’ individual damages, and satisfying the
predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3). As we discuss, to be admissible,
sampling evidence must be relevant and reliable and satisfy Daubert and
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 standards. One avenue to admissibility is to
demonstrate that an individual class member could rely on the sampling
evidence to prove liability or damages in an individual action, a proposition
endorsed by the entire Tyson Court. 44 Before exploring each of these topics,
we offer a brief history of attempts to use sampling evidence in class actions
38

Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1048.
Id.
40
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.493, at 103 (2004); see Wal-Mart,
564 U.S. at 357. The sampling evidence in Wal-Mart was also rejected because it purportedly
would deprive Wal-Mart of its right “to litigate its [Title VII] statutory defenses to individual
claims.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367. Rejecting sampling evidence because it is not representative
is logical. But, the latter proposition is a non sequitur. The Tyson Court did not explain how class
heterogeneity detrimentally affects a class defendant’s right to interpose statutory defenses to
individual claims.
41
564 U.S. at 349.
42
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1048.
43
Id. at 1046 (citing FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 702); see Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 860 F.3d
389, 399 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Tyson did not create a rule limiting representative evidence beyond the
well-established standards of admissibility.”).
44
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
39
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before Wal-Mart and Tyson, which may help to explain the prior judicial
reluctance to accept it. 45
D. Brief Bleak History of Sampling Evidence in
Federal Court Class Actions
Even before Wal-Mart and the Supreme Court’s condemnation of “Trial
by Formula,” few federal courts embraced sampling evidence to determine
classwide issues. Judicial reluctance to admit such evidence is explained, at
least in part, not by any fault with this statistical methodology, but with its
improper application.46 A brief history is illuminating. The leading federal
court cases before Wal-Mart and Tyson are discussed immediately below.
1. Cimino v. Raymark Industries
The tortuous history of mass tort asbestos litigation in the Eastern
District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit is emblematic of the difficulties that
trial courts face attempting to efficiently and fairly manage class action
claims by using sampling. The “odyssey” began in 1986 when District Judge
Robert M. Parker certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class for the trial of certain
common issues, including the viability of the “state of the art” defense
interposed by defendant asbestos manufacturers. 47 After an interlocutory
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed District Judge Parker’s order to certify the
Rule 23(b)(3) class.48
District Judge Parker then issued pre-trial orders, consolidating over
3,000 personal injury cases for a single jury trial on the “state of the art”
defense and punitive damages issues, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a), and
certifying a class “for the remaining issues of exposure and actual damages,”
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 49 The trial was planned to proceed in
three phases. Phase I would follow the procedure approved in Jenkins to
decide the “state of the art” defense and punitive damages issues. 50 Phase II,
before the same jury, would include a full trial of liability and damages for the
eleven class representatives, with additional evidence from thirty illustrative
45

See infra notes 46–81 and accompanying text.
There is ample guidance about the proper use of statistics. See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET
AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 4–7 (5th ed. 2012); DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE:
EXPERT EVIDENCE §§ 12.1–12.10 (2014); JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS
ACTIONS §§ 8:6–8:13 (14th ed. 2017); 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS §§ 11:1–11:21 (5th ed. 2014); Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 211–302.
47
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470–71 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing viability
of “state of the art” defense); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex.
1990), rev’d in part, vacated in part by 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (describing asbestos
litigation as an “odyssey”).
48
Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 475.
49
In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1990).
50
Id.
46
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class members, fifteen selected by plaintiffs and fifteen selected by
defendants.51 In this Phase, the jury would hear expert evidence and
determine aggregate damages for each subclass.52 Finally, in Phase III, “any
awarded damages [would] be distributed utilizing various techniques.”53
While “encourag[ing] the district court to continue its imaginative and
innovative efforts to confront these cases,”54 the Fifth Circuit vacated the
order for the Phase II trial, and the associated Rule 23(b)(3) class certification
order, because, among other things, “[t]here are too many disparities [e.g.,
different diseases, product identification, manners and degrees of exposure,
lifestyle differences] . . . for their common concerns to predominate.” 55
On remand, the case proceeded as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action jury trial:
Phase I on the issues of liability and punitive damages and “complete cases of
ten class representatives.” 56 “After an eight week trial, the jury found for the
[p]laintiffs and awarded nine of the class representatives approximately $3.5
million in actual damages.” 57 The jury also found defendant asbestos
manufacturers grossly negligent and assessed punitive damages. 58 The need
for Phase II was obviated when the parties stipulated to asbestos “exposure”
issues.59
To resolve damages issues, in Phase III, almost 2,300 class members
were divided into five disease categories (i.e., subclasses) based on plaintiffs’
injury claims. 60 District Judge Parker selected a random sample of class
members from each category for trial before a jury.61 He ruled that “[e]ach
plaintiff whose damage case was submitted to the jury is to be awarded his
individual verdict and the average verdict for each disease category will
constitute the damage award for each non-sample class member.” 62 The
claims of the randomly selected 160 class members were tried over 133
days. 63 District Judge Parker ordered that each of the more than 2,100
remaining class members (“extrapolation cases”) would be entitled to
51

Id. at 709.
Id.
53
Id. at 707.
54
Id. at 712.
55
Id.
56
Cimino v. Raymark Indus, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 328, 329 (E.D. Tex. 1990), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
57
Id. at 330.
58
Id.
59
Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 654.
60
Id. at 653; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (“When appropriate, a class may be divided into
subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.”).
61
Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653.
62
Id. Plaintiffs agreed to this procedure, waiving their rights to individual damages
determinations. See id.; Cimino, 739 F. Supp. at 329.
63
Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653. According to District Judge Parker, Phase III “utilizes the
science of statistics, or more specifically, inferential statistics.” Id. at 659.
52
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individual damages equal to the average of the verdicts in the sample cases in
the same disease category. 64
Almost eight years after the trials, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
judgments entered in the Phase III sample cases as well as the “extrapolation
cases,” holding that, under the governing law of Texas, “causation must be
determined as to individuals, not groups,” and that defendants had Seventh
Amendment rights to have a jury make that determination. 65
2. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos
During the protracted interval between the trial court judgments in
Cimino and their reversal by the Fifth Circuit, the District of Hawaii used
inferential statistics to calculate individual damages for over 9,500 Rule
23(b)(3) class members in a class action against the Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos, the former dictator of the Philippines, based on alleged violations of
64

Id. at 664–65; Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1998).
Cimino, 151 F.3d at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). Significantly, the Fifth Circuit
also observed that none of plaintiffs’ experts “purported to say that the damages suffered by the
phase III plaintiffs in a given disease category (whether as disclosed by the phase III evidence or
as found by the jury) were to any extent representative of the damages suffered by the
extrapolation plaintiffs in the same disease category.” Id. at 320–21 nn.23–25, 48.
The three-judge Fifth Circuit panel in Cimino (Garza, Garwood and Davis, JJ.) distinguished
the opinion and decision of another panel (Jones, DeMoss and Parker, JJ.) in In re Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1997), which had been issued during the almost eight-year
hiatus between the federal district court sample trials and the issuance of the appellate decision in
Cimino. Interestingly, In re Chevron was authored by then Circuit Judge Robert M. Parker, who
had ordered and presided over the Cimino trials as a federal district court judge before his
elevation to the Circuit Court.
In re Chevron involved claims by approximately 3,000 neighboring property owners for
personal injuries and property damage allegedly caused by contamination from Chevron’s
abandoned crude oil storage waste pit. 109 F.3d at 1017. The trial court directed that thirty
individuals be chosen, fifteen by plaintiffs and fifteen by defendants, and that there be “a unitary
trial on the issues of ‘general liability or causation’ on behalf of the remaining plaintiffs, as well as
the individual causation and damage issues of the [thirty] selected plaintiffs.” Id. If the “unitary
trial” established that Chevron was responsible for the “pollutants that, allegedly, give rise to all of
the plaintiffs’ claims,” then individual causation and damages issues for the unchosen claimants
would be determined subsequently at separate trials. Id. at 1019.
The In re Chevron Court (per Parker, J.) found that the thirty selected claimants were neither
shown, nor chosen, to be representative of the other claimants, and opined that “[a] bellwether trial
designed to achieve its value ascertainment function for settlement purposes or to answer
troubling causation or liability issues common to the universe of claimants has as a core element
representativeness.” Id. For a discussion of “bellwether” trials, see infra note 197 and
accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit granted Chevron’s petition for mandamus prohibiting
“utilization of the results obtained from the trial of the thirty (30) selected cases for any purpose
affecting issues or claims of, or defenses to, the remaining untried cases.” Id. at 1021.
Later in its appellate decision in Cimino, the Fifth Circuit described the language in Circuit
Judge Parker’s opinion “generally looking with favor on the use of bellwether verdicts when
shown to be statistically representative,” see In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1019–20, as “plainly
dicta . . . insofar as it might suggest that representative bellwether verdicts could properly be used
to determine individual causation and damages for other plaintiffs.” Cimino, 151 F.3d at 318.
65
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the Alien Tort Statute and the Tort Victim Protection Act. 66 The federal
district court segregated the trial into three phases: liability, exemplary
damages, and compensatory damages. 67 After finding liability and awarding
exemplary damages, in the compensatory damages phase of the trial, the trial
court “allowed the jury to consider” the “damages sustained by a random
sample of plaintiffs as representative of damages suffered by the entire
class.”68 The Special Master appointed by the trial court reviewed the
depositions of 137 randomly selected claimants. 69 He reported to the jury
“recommending the damages suffered by the 137 claimants, to give the jury a
statistically valid representation of damages suffered by the entire class.”70
The trial court cited and followed District Judge Parker’s trial plan in Cimino
as “precedent,” dividing the class members into three subclasses based upon
each plaintiff’s claims, and selecting a random sample from the class
population.71 Each plaintiff who was a member of the random sample, and
who had a valid claim, was awarded individual damages. 72 The average
verdict for each subclass was awarded to the non-sample class members. 73
On appeal, the Estate’s challenge to the trial procedure adopted by the
trial court was “very narrow”: “[i]t challenges specifically only ‘the method
by which [the district court] allowed the validity of the class claims to be
determined’: the master’s use of a representative sample to determine what
percentage of the total claims were invalid.” 74 To the Ninth Circuit, the
grounds for the Estate’s “challenges” were “unclear” and “poorly presented,”
but, still, the “Estate’s due-process claim does raise serious questions.” 75
Applying the due process balancing test set forth in Connecticut v. Doehr 76
and Matthews v. Eldridge,77 the Ninth Circuit weighed the Estate’s “only
interest,” the “total amount of damages for which it will be liable,” with the
66

In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw.
1995); see Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
67
In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1462.
68
Id. at 1462, 1464.
69
Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 706 (Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses).
70
In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1464. It is noteworthy that defendant Estate “did not appear
at any of the depositions” or “depose any of the . . . class members to test the procedure employed
by the Court, or to acquire evidence to refute the fairness to the defendant of this random selection
process using inferential statistical methodology.” Id. at 1465.
71
Id. at 1467.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 784 (9th Cir. 1996) (alteration in the original).
The Ninth Circuit stated that District Judge Parker’s opinion in Cimino “apparently helped
persuade the district court [of Hawaii] to use this method.” Id.; see Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 659–
67.
75
Hilao, 103 F.3d at 784–85. The Ninth Circuit distinguished the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
In re Fibreboard Corp. on the ground that it was based on Texas substantive law. Id.; see In re
Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711–12 (5th Cir. 1990).
76
501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991).
77
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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class members’ “enormous” interest in the sampling methodology, “since
adversarial resolution of each class member’s claim would pose
insurmountable practical hurdles,” and with the judiciary’s “‘ancillary’
interest” in avoiding “individual adversarial determinations of claim validity
[that] would clog the docket of the district court for years.” 78 It held that the
trial court’s “unorthodox” statistical “methodology in determining valid
claims” passed due process muster. 79
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit’s Hilao decision pre-dated the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Cimino, which rejected District Judge Parker’s trial plan
that had “persuad[ed]” the District of Hawaii to use a sampling
methodology. 80 Moreover, it is doubtful that the vitality of the Hilao sampling
methodology survives Wal-Mart.81
Suffice it to say, the sampling methodologies proposed in Cimino and
Hilao did not present sampling evidence in its best light. Tyson may represent
78

Hilao, 103 F.3d at 786–87.
Id.
80
See Cimino 151 F.3d at 297; Hilao 103 F.3d at 767. Another case that raised statistical
evidence issues is Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d
198 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d. in part, 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003). In that case, plaintiffs’ experts
used a random sample of subscriber depositions “to extrapolate statistically meaningful inferences
about the plaintiff subscriber population as a whole” and “statistical evidence about the effect of
the defendants’ misleading statements on smoking behavior.” Id. at 226–28.
On appeal, the Second Circuit found “without merit” defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs’
reliance on “aggregate (i.e., statistical) proof of causation and damages” violated their
constitutional rights to a jury trial and to due process, but certified to the New York Court of
Appeals the question of whether, under the facts of the case, New York’s consumer protection
statute, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349, requires individual proof of harm. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 211, 225–28 (2d Cir. 2003). The New York Court
of Appeals did not reach that question because it answered in the affirmative another certified
question: whether the claims of a third-party payer of health care costs, such as Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, were too remote to be recovered derivatively under the statute, thereby mooting the
certified individual proof of harm question. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 818 N.E. 2d 1140, 1146 (N.Y. 2004). As a result of the New York Court of Appeals
response to that certified question, the Second Circuit reversed the jury trial verdict on a ground
that was not related to the expert statistical evidence introduced at trial. Empire Healthchoice, Inc.
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004).
Subsequently, in a putative Rule 23(b)(3) class action based on claims under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012), the Second
Circuit ruled that common issues did not predominate over individual issues of reliance, injury,
and damages. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008). More to the point,
the court rejected, as violative of the Rules Enabling Act and the Due Process Clause, plaintiffs’
“fluid recovery” proposal whereby “defendant’s aggregate liability is determined in a single,
class-wide adjudication” and “individual class members are afforded an opportunity to collect
their individual shares, ‘usually through a simplified proof of claim procedure.’” Id. at 231–33.
The court held that “fluid recovery” could not be used to “mask the prevalence of individual
issues.” Id. at 232.
81
See supra note 23. The Supreme Court’s discussion of “Trial by Formula” in Wal-Mart
does not refer to Hilao, but the majority noted that the Ninth Circuit approved the trial plan in
Wal-Mart in reliance on Hilao. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 348; Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
603 F.3d 571, 627–28 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
79
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the advent of a more open-minded view by the Supreme Court toward the
proper use of sampling evidence in class actions.
We now turn to the standards governing the admissibility of sampling
evidence in class actions.
II. SAMPLING EVIDENCE AND CLASS CERTIFICATION DISPUTES
A. Admissibility of Expert Evidence
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals established new standards for
the admissibility of expert evidence in federal courts. 82 Further, because a
decision to grant or deny a motion for class certification is often outcomedeterminative of an entire case, and a class certification ruling is frequently
based on expert evidence, expert evidence is now de rigueur in class
certification disputes and Daubert and its progeny are often on center stage.83
82
509 U.S. 579, 585–89 (1993) (holding the “general acceptance” test of Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), for the admissibility of scientific evidence that had
been applied by many federal and state courts had been superseded by the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, specifically Rule 702); see ERIC R. HARLAN ET AL., AM. BAR
ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG. TRIAL EVIDENCE COMM., DAUBERT V. FRYE: A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY
OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (2016).
83
See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729
(2013) (arguing that, in recent years, the ability to bring class action lawsuits has become
problematic).
For a class action defendant, “[c]ertification of a large class may so increase the defendant’s
potential damages liability and litigation costs that he may find it economically prudent to settle
and to abandon a meritorious defense.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978);
see Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
97, 99 (2009) (“With vanishingly rare exception, class certification sets the litigation on a path
toward resolution by way of settlement . . . .”); see also, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a
risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low.”); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75
F.3d 1069, 1086–87 & n.19 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulene Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298
(7th Cir. 1995) (noting that defendants facing large classwide damages awards “will be under
intense pressure to settle”).
For a class action plaintiff, “a refusal to certify a class . . . may induce a plaintiff to abandon
his individual claim.” Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 470 (discussing interlocutory appeals and
“death knell” doctrine); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.213, at 40 (2004)
(“Denial of class certification may effectively end the litigation.”).
Note that Coopers & Lybrand was decided before the 1998 adoption of Rule 23(f)
authorizing discretionary interlocutory appellate review of class certification rulings. Following an
instruction by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (“[t]he courts of appeal will develop
standards for granting review” under Rule 23(f)), Circuit Courts have established general
standards to decide whether a class certification ruling warrants interlocutory review. FED. R. CIV.
P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1998 amendment; see, e.g., Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d
1259, 1263–64 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98,
102–06 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154,
165 (3d Cir. 2001); Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., 181 F.3d 832, 834–35 (7th Cir. 1999).
Case studies have suggested that “aggregation of related cases at a very young stage may
benefit defendants, while aggregation of related cases in an ‘adolescent’ stage (i.e., after plaintiffs
have achieved early breakthrough victories) may favor plaintiffs. Moreover, experimental studies
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After Daubert, a federal district court acts as the “gatekeep[er]” to ensure
that, to be admissible, proffered expert evidence is “not only relevant, but
reliable.”84
Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” 85 “The Rules’ basic standard of
relevance thus is a liberal one.”86 Relevant evidence is generally
admissible. 87 Pursuant to Rule 702(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
expert evidence is admissible if it “will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”88 Therefore, expert evidence must
be based on the facts of the case: “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires
a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility.” 89 In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence embody a “liberal
thrust” and a “general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
‘opinion’ testimony.” 90
To be reliable, the subject of an expert’s testimony must be “scientific
knowledge.” 91 “‘[S]cientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science,” and “‘knowledge’ . . . . applies to any body of known
facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on
good grounds.” 92 To qualify as “scientific knowledge,” therefore, an inference
based on statistics must be “derived by the scientific method,” and related

have shown that aggregation helps plaintiffs with weak cases and hurts plaintiffs with strong cases
in terms of damages, and have generally (though not entirely) pro-plaintiff effects in terms of
liability.” JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION: PROBLEMS IN
ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (2002) (citations omitted); see BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN &
THOMAS E. WILLIGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET
GUIDE FOR JUDGES 6 (2005) (finding that 90% of class actions settle); Thomas E. Willging &
Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference
Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 606–07 (2006) (noting that, in an empirical study
of state and federal class actions, “all certified class actions settled on a class-wide basis”).
84
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 597; see FED. R. EVID. 401, 702. The trial “court must decide
any preliminary questions about whether . . . evidence is admissible.” FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
85
FED. R. EVID. 401.
86
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
87
See FED. R. EVID. 402.
88
FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
89
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591–92. In explaining the required relevancy of expert testimony, the
Daubert Court adopted the characterization of Circuit Judge Edward R. Becker in United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985), and United States v. Downing, 609 F. Supp. 784,
791–92 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985), “as one of ‘fit.’” 509 U.S. at 591. The
relevancy inquiry is: Does the expert evidence “fit” the case?
90
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp.
v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
91
Id. at 589–90.
92
Id. at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)).
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expert statistical evidence “must be supported by appropriate validation.” 93
This “establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.” 94
The Daubert Court noted “that scientists typically distinguish between
‘validity’ (does the principle support what it purports to show?) and
‘reliability’ (does application of the principle produce consistent results?).” 95
The Court emphasized that it was referring to “evidentiary reliability—that is,
trustworthiness,” and instructed, “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”96
Thus, to discharge its responsibility as “gatekeeper,” a federal district
court must determine “whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or
93

Id.
Id.
95
Id. at 590 n.9 (citing Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L.
REV. 595, 599 (1988)). According to the author of the cited article, scientific validity depends on
the acceptance of the “scientific practice and the soundness and cogency of the entire pattern of
reasoning leading to the expert’s conclusion.” Black, supra at 600. He continues, “[w]idespread
consensus and acceptance, therefore, is the central test that scientists use to decide the validity of
theories and reasoning in any given context, which is a test that the law can adopt and use
successfully.” Id. at 601 (footnotes omitted). The citation to this article is curious in light of the
Daubert Court’s rejection of the Frye test.
96
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that a federal district court’s “gatekeeper” role encompasses all expert evidence,
not only “scientific” evidence, pointing out that Rule 702 “makes no relevant distinction between
‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge,” and “applies its
reliability standard to all . . . matters within its scope.” 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). As the Supreme
Court recognized in a decision after Daubert, under Rule 702, all expert evidence must comply
with “exacting standards of reliability.” Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
Compare the Daubert Court’s explanation with the discussion regarding reliability and
validity of statistics in the Reference Guide on Statistics:
94

Reliability and validity are two aspects of accuracy in measurement. In statistics,
reliability refers to reproducibility of results. A reliable measuring instrument
returns consistent measurements. . . .
Reliability can be ascertained by measuring the same quantity several times; the
measurements must be made independently to avoid bias. Given independence, the
correlation coefficient . . . between repeated measurements can be used as a measure
of reliability. . . .
Two different aspects of reliability should be considered. First, the “withinobserver variability” of judgments should be small—the same evaluator should rate
essentially identical cases in similar ways. Second, the “between-observer
variability” should be small—different evaluators should rate the same cases in
essentially the same way. . . .
Reliability is necessary but not sufficient to ensure accuracy. In addition to
reliability, validity is needed. A valid measuring instrument measures what it is
supposed to. . . .
When there is an established way of measuring a variable, a new measurement
process can be validated by comparison with the established one. . . . A common
measure of validity is the correlation coefficient between the predictor and the
criterion . . . .
Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 227–28 (footnotes omitted).
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determine a fact in issue.” 97 As the Daubert Court explained, “[t]his entails a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” 98 “Pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those
demands.” 99
The Daubert Court offered federal courts five non-exclusive factors to
guide the “flexible” “inquiry envisioned by Rule 702” regarding whether “a
theory or technique is scientific knowledge.” 100 To assess whether a “theory
or technique” exhibits scientific validity, federal courts should consider:
“whether it can be (and has been) tested” (“[o]rdinarily, a key question”);
“whether [it] has been subjected to peer review and publication”; “known or
potential rate of error”; “existence and maintenance of standards controlling
[its] operation”; and “general acceptance.” 101
In response to Daubert and the many cases applying it, Rule 702 was
amended in 2000. 102 As pointed out by the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, that amendment “provides some general standards that the trial court
must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert
testimony.” 103 Those mandatory standards are: “the expert’s scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”; “the testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data”; “the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods”; and “the expert has reliably applied the principles
and methods to the facts of the case.” 104
97

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
Id. at 592–93.
99
Id. at 597.
100
Id. at 593–94.
101
Id. at 593–94. In General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, a unanimous Supreme Court held that an
appellate court should apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a federal district
court’s Daubert evidentiary ruling to admit or exclude expert testimony, whether or not the ruling
is “outcome determinative.” 522 U.S. 136, 141–43, 146 (1997).
A party will likely have only one chance to pass by the federal district court “gatekeeper.” In
Weisgram, plaintiff won a jury verdict. The Eighth Circuit, however, held that plaintiff’s expert’s
testimony was speculative and should have been excluded, and granted judgment as a matter of
law for defendants. Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455. Plaintiff argued that he should have a right to a
new trial and to introduce additional expert evidence, but the Supreme Court rejected the
argument: “Since Daubert . . . parties relying on expert evidence have had notice of exacting
standards of reliability such evidence must meet. . . . It is implausible to suggest, post-Daubert,
that parties will initially present less than their best expert evidence in the expectation of a second
chance should their first try fail.” Id.
102
FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 was amended again in 2011: “These changes are intended to
be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.”
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2011 amendment.
103
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment (emphasis added).
104
FED. R. EVID. 702.
98
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The Advisory Committee also enumerated factors to add to the Daubert
Court’s “non-exclusive checklist” that are “relevant in determining whether
expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact,”
including:
(1) Whether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing
naturally and directly out of research they have conducted
independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed
their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion.
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious
alternative explanations.
(4) Whether the expert is being as careful as he would be in his
regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting.
(5) Whether the field of experience claimed by the expert is known
to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would
give. 105
The 2000 amendment to Rule 702 expressly provides that a federal
district court “must scrutinize not only the principles and methods used by the
expert, but also whether those principles and methods have been properly
applied to the facts of the case.” 106
B. Admissibility of Sampling Evidence
As the 2015 edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth)
succinctly summarizes, when “sampling to generate data about a population
so the data will be verified or declared true,” “the reliability and validity of
estimates about the population derived from sampling are critical.” 107
Relevant factors to determine whether “sampling methods . . . conform to
generally recognized statistical standards” include: “the population was
properly chosen and defined”; “the sample chosen was representative of that
105
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
106
Id. As the Daubert Court made clear, “[t]he focus, of course, must be solely on principles
and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” 509 U.S. at 595. That said,
“conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another . . . . [N]othing in either
Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Joiner, 522 U.S. at
146; see ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp. 696 F.3d 254, 291 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that reliability
“applies to all aspects of an expert’s testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s
opinion, [and] the link between the facts and the conclusion” (quoting Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc.,
167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999))).
107
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.493, at 102 (2015).
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population”; “the data gathered were accurately reported”; and “the data were
analyzed in accordance with accepted statistical principles.” 108 Adhering to
these standards enables the proponent of sampling evidence to convincingly
argue that the proffered evidence is “scientific knowledge” and “will assist
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue,” and is,
consequently, admissible. 109 And, as stated in the Reference Guide on
Statistics:
Statistical studies suitably designed to address a material issue
generally will be admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. . . . Because most statistical methods relied on in court
are described in textbooks or journal articles and are capable of
producing useful results when properly applied, these methods
generally satisfy important aspects of the “scientific knowledge”
requirement in [Daubert]. . . . Of course, a particular study may use
a method that is entirely appropriate but that is so poorly executed
that it should be inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 403
and 702. 110 Or, the method may be inappropriate for the problem at
hand and thus lack the “fit” spoken of in Daubert. Or the study
might rest on data of the type not reasonably relied on by
statisticians or substantive experts and hence run afoul of Federal
Rules of Evidence 703. 111 Often, however, the battle over statistical
evidence concerns weight or sufficiency rather than
admissibility. 112

108

Id. at 103.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. The burden is on the proponent of the expert evidence to show
that it meets all Daubert requirements. Id.
110
FED. R. EVID. 403 (internal footnote supplied). The Rule, titled “Excluding Relevant
Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons,” states: “The court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Id.
111
FED. R. EVID. 703 (internal footnote supplied). The Rule, titled “Bases of an Expert,”
states:
109

An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would
reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject,
they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data
would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to
the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Id.

112

Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 214 (original footnotes omitted).
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C. Generally Accepted Statistical Standards
An expert statistician can randomly select a sample from a population of
class members’ damages claims for individual adjudications and estimate the
average value of the claims. “The precision of an estimate is usually reported
in terms of the standard error and a confidence interval.” 113
An estimate based on a sample of class members’ damages claims may
be inaccurate because of random error. The standard error measures the
“likely magnitude of this random error.” 114 The standard deviation measures
heterogeneity. 115 “The less heterogeneity in the values, the smaller the
standard error.”116
“Usually, a confidence interval for the population average is centered at
the sample average; the desired confidence level is obtained by adding and
subtracting a suitable multiple of the standard error.”117 Many statisticians use
+/- 1.96 standard errors to arrive at a 95% confidence interval. 118 Using this
heuristic, a statistician who opines that the population average is “within 2
standard errors” of the sample average will be correct about 95% of the
time. 119
In a sampling study, it is thus possible that an observation (e.g.,
estimated average value) is due to sampling error. 120 An alternative (or
complement) to using confidence intervals to express the uncertainty of an
estimate, or to make decisions notwithstanding the uncertainty of an estimate,
is to use p-values. “The p-value is the probability of getting data as extreme
as, or more extreme than, the actual data—given that the null hypothesis [or
default hypothesis, such as ‘no difference’ between two populations] is
true.”121 If the p-value of the observed result is less than a defined
significance level, it may be probabilistically concluded that the null
hypothesis should be rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis. 122
Typically, a significance level of five percent is chosen. Below this threshold,

113

Id. at 241 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 243.
115
Id. Statisticians distinguish between “the standard error of the sample average, which
measures the likely size of the random error in the sample average,” and “the standard deviation of
the sample, which measures the spread in the sample data.” Id. at 243 n.87.
116
Id. at 243.
117
Id. at 244.
118
Id. at 244 n.89.
119
Id. at 244.
120
See EARL R. BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 185–226 (13th ed. 2013)
(discussing survey sampling); VINCENT FLAHERTY, COMPASSIONATE STATISTICS: APPLIED
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 127–38 (2008) (discussing probability and
statistical significance).
121
Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 250.
122
See R. MARK SIRKIN, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 271–316 (3d ed. 2005).
114
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the observed result is called “statistically significant,” that is, not due to
sampling error. 123
Using these generally accepted statistical concepts (standard errors,
confidence intervals, and p-values) in measuring the accuracy of an estimated
average value of individual damages claims in a class action would easily
satisfy the “scientific knowledge” and “fit” requirements of Daubert and
Rules 702 and 703. However, these concepts do not recommend a
methodology to follow to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance prerequisite
where, as is often the case, individual class member’s damages claims vary.
Recalling that the Supreme Court distinguished the classes (and
decisions) in Wal-Mart and Tyson based on the degree of heterogeneity within
the employee populations, it is clear that the Court was concerned about the
reliability of the sampling methodologies employed by plaintiffs’ experts in
both cases. In Wal-Mart, the Court found that the employees were not
“similarly situated” and, therefore, “none of them could have prevailed in an
individual suit by relying on” evidence relating to other employees. 124 In WalMart, therefore, “there would be little or no role for representative
evidence.” 125 “In contrast,” the “circumstances” in Tyson (“each employee
worked in the same facility, did similar work, and was paid under the same
policy”) “confirms” that “experiences of a subset of employees can be
probative as to the experiences of all of them.” 126 Consequently, in Tyson, the
123
See JAY L. DEVORE, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS FOR ENGINEERING AND THE
SCIENCES 300–44 (8th ed. 2011) (discussing tests for hypotheses based on sampling). According
to a leading law and economics jurist, recently retired Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh
Circuit, “statistically significant at the five percent level” means “that the probability that the
investigation would have yielded this result even if the hypothesis that it was trying to test was
false is no greater than five percent.” Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of
Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1510–11 (1999) (footnote omitted). He points out that social
scientists consider results at the two percent or one percent level “more robust” and “highly
significant.” Id. at 1511. Judge Posner continues:

What is true is that the higher the significance level of a statistical study, the more
reliable the study is as evidence; and the lower that level, the less reliable it is. A
low significance level may reflect an unsound method of statistical estimation, an
incorrect specification of the hypothesis being tested, or the omission of relevant
variables that if included would have caused the hypothesis to be rejected. . . . But if
the study has been conducted responsibly and has withstood a hammering from the
opponent’s expert, failure to reach the conventional five percent significance level
would not be a good reason for excluding the evidence just because a social scientist
who violated the conventions of his discipline by reporting results that do not attain
the conventional significance level might be considered untrustworthy.
Id. But, Judge Posner concludes that, given the “cost of weak statistical evidence,” and “[g]iven
the difficulty that judges and jurors have in understanding and weighing statistical evidence, there
is an argument . . . for excluding statistical evidence that the relevant profession . . . considers
weak.” Id. at 1512.
124
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016).
125
Id.
126
Id.
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Court held that it was proper to draw a “just and reasonable inference” from
the statistical evidence to prove the “amount and extent of” work performed
by each class member, and, as Chief Justice Roberts stated in his concurring
opinion, the “just and reasonable inference” standard of proof “would apply
in any case.” 127
In a recent article, one author summarized the evidentiary issue in this
manner:
The threshold question for admitting such evidence is therefore not
about whether the evidence is statistical or representative more
broadly, or even about whether direct evidence, if it existed, would
exhibit any differences across plaintiffs. Rather, the threshold
question that evidence law poses for any such evidence is whether
it is relevant [as Rule 401 defines relevance]. . . . When the
evidence in question involves expert testimony, then Rule 702 and
Daubert also come into play. 128
In short, the more heterogeneous the individual damages claims of the
class members are from one another, the less confident one can be that the
sample average can be accurately applied to calculate individual damages.
In Part IV of this Article, we propose a method to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance, notwithstanding variable individual damages claims.
Specifically, we propose a statistically-based threshold for admissibility of
sampling evidence by showing that, when judgment variability exceeds claim
variability (two terms we define), applying the mean of damages awards for
sampled class members’ claims, rather than individual damages awards,
improves accuracy. We demonstrate that, in many circumstances, sampling
evidence is more accurate and more reliable than individual damages awards
and, therefore, admissible.
D. Daubert and Class Certification Proceedings
Daubert has played a critical, often decisive, role in class certification
proceedings. As prerequisites to class certification, plaintiffs must show,
among other things, that “there are questions of law or fact common to the
class” and, if plaintiffs seek classwide damages, that “the questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
127
Id. at 1047 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); id. at 1051 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
128
Gelbach, supra note 9, at 1830–31. Professor Gelbach opines that the “critical question for
any representative evidence” is whether “those who testify or form the sample used to create
statistical evidence are similar enough in relevant ways to reliably measure” the disputed value for
an individual class member. Id. at 1831.
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methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 129 With
increasing frequency, expert evidence is proffered during class certification
proceedings to attempt to satisfy or defeat the commonality, predominance,
and superiority prerequisites. With equally increasing frequency, Daubert
challenges are made to the proffered expert evidence.
In Comcast, although the Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of
certiorari to review, among other questions presented for review, the question
of whether Daubert standards for the admissibility of expert evidence apply
in class certification proceedings, the Court did not reach that question
because, at trial, Comcast failed to “timely object to or move to strike”
plaintiffs’ expert’s damages model. 130 However, a majority of Circuit Courts
that have considered the question, both before and after Comcast, have held
that a full Daubert analysis of expert evidence is required at the class
certification stage. 131
In dicta, the Wal-Mart Court signaled its view: “[T]he District Court
concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at the certification
stage of class-action proceedings. . . . We doubt that is so . . . .” 132 Therefore,
the clear weight of authority is that expert evidence will be scrutinized under

129
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), 23(b)(3) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (“[W]e think it clear that individualized monetary claims belong
in Rule 23(b)(3).”).
130
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 39–40 (2013) (Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting); see FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)(A) (“A party may claim error in a ruling to admit . . .
evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and . . . [the party] on the record
. . . timely objects or moves to strike . . . .”).
131
See, e.g., In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir. 2015); Messner
v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2012); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011); Sher v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. App’x 887, 890–91 (11th
Cir. 2011); In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 528–32 (6th Cir. 2008); Unger v.
Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005). The Eighth Circuit represents the minority
view. See, e.g., Smith v. Conoco Phillips Pipe Line Co., 801 F.3d 921, 925 n.2 (8th Cir. 2015); In
re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 614 (8th Cir. 2011) (ruling that federal
district court “did not err by conducting a focused Daubert analysis” at class certification stage).
See generally L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Between “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using
Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1041 (2004); George G. Gordon & Irene Ayzenberg-Lyman, The Role of Daubert in Scrutinizing
Expert Testimony in Class Certification, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 132 (2014), http://
www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Gordon_Final_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/KDC8T2PH]; Richard L. Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the
Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324 (2011); Meredith M. Price, The Proper
Application of Daubert to Expert Testimony in Class Certification, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1349 (2012); Heather P. Scribner, Rigorous Analysis of the Class Certification Expert: The Roles
of Daubert and the Defendant’s Proof, 28 REV. LITIG. 71 (2008).
132
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added). This view is consistent with the Court’s
instruction in Daubert that a federal district court, “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific
testimony . . . must determine [the admissibility of the evidence] at the outset.” Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 592–93 & n.10.
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Daubert standards during class certification proceedings. As one author
argued:
If defendant contends that the evidence relied upon by plaintiffs for
class certification would be inadmissible at trial, the court must
decide the admissibility question at the class certification stage. For
example, if testimony relied on by plaintiffs in support of
certification would be admissible under one view of the substantive
law but inadmissible under another, the court must decide the legal
issue to ensure that, in fact, plaintiffs’ evidence supporting class
certification would in fact be admissible at trial.133
He cogently explained, “[i]f an expert will not be permitted to testify at all at
trial, plaintiff should not be able to rely on that inadmissible testimony in
support of class certification.” 134
In sum, a federal district court must be convinced that, “if credited by
the fact finder,” plaintiff’s evidence supporting class certification would tend
to prove one or more liability or damages claims or defenses on a classwide
basis. 135 Therefore, the evidence must be admissible and, for expert evidence,
it must be relevant and reliable and otherwise satisfy Daubert standards.
“Once the court determines that plaintiff[’s] evidence is . . . admissible at trial,
however, it should not weigh plaintiff[’s] evidence against defendant’s
evidence” to attempt to resolve which is more persuasive. 136
The factors identified by the Supreme Court and the Advisory
Committee guide the inquiry into the relevancy and reliability of expert
testimony and create a framework for determining the admissibility of
sampling evidence in class actions, including during class certification
proceedings. 137
III. SAMPLING EVIDENCE AND CLASS ACTION PREREQUISITES:
COMMONALITY, PREDOMINANCE, AND SUPERIORITY
The answer to the question whether sampling evidence is admissible to
prove classwide liability or classwide damages is rooted in the prerequisites
for class certification. “A party seeking class certification must affirmatively
demonstrate . . . compliance with [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23].” 138
Rule 23(a)’s four threshold requirements—numerosity (or impracticability of
joinder), commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation—
133

Klonoff, supra note 83, at 758.
Id. at 760.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 760–61; see infra notes 163–167 and accompanying text.
137
See supra notes 100–106 and accompanying text.
138
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
134
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“effectively ‘limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named
plaintiff’s claims.’” 139 Certification is proper only “if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied.”140
A. Commonality
Commonality requires plaintiffs to show that “there are questions of law
or fact common to the class.” 141 In brief, “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff
to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” 142
Consequently, the class claims must depend on a “common contention,” one
that “is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of
its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each
one of the claims in one stroke.” 143 “Identifying common questions typically
139

Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw. v.
EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)). Disputes regarding the admissibility of statistical evidence in
class actions most often arise in the contexts of the commonality prerequisite of Rule 23(a)(2) and
the predominance and superiority prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3). For present purposes, numerosity
(or impracticability of joinder), typicality, and adequacy of representation are therefore of little
moment. For a thorough discussion of those prerequisites, see 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL.,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 3:11–3:17, at 185–227 (5th ed. 2016) (numerosity (or
impracticability of joinder)); id. §§ 3:28–3:49, at 262–320 (typicality); id. §§ 3:50–3:88, at 320–
443 (adequacy of representation); as well as the implicit requirements of definiteness, id. §§ 3:2–
3:7, at 155–76, and ascertainability of class membership, id. §§ 3:8–3:10, at 176–85.
140
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161; see Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351 (“Frequently that ‘rigorous
analysis’ will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.”); Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (“[T]he class determination generally involves
considerations that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of
action.’” (quoting Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963) (footnote
omitted))).
Initially, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the Supreme Court
pronounced “[w]e find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it
may be maintained as a class action.” 417 U.S. at 177. However, four years later, in Coopers &
Lybrand, the Court retreated from this bright-line proposition by quoting approvingly from a
leading treatise: “Evaluation of many of the questions entering into determination of class action
questions [e.g., typicality, adequacy of representation, commonality] is intimately involved with
the merits of the claims . . . . The more complex determinations required in Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions entail even greater entanglement with the merits . . . .” 437 U.S. at 469 n.12 (quoting 15
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911, at 485 n.45
(1976)). Then, in Falcon, the Court surmised that “sometimes it may be necessary for the court to
probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.” 457 U.S. at 160.
The Court subsequently made it clear that Rule 23 does not authorize “free-ranging merits
inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to
the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether Rule 23 prerequisites for class
certification are satisfied.” Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466
(2013).
141
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
142
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349–50 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157).
143
Id. at 350.
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requires examining the parties’ claims and defenses, identifying the type of
proof the parties expect to present, and deciding the extent to which there is a
need for individual, as opposed to common, proof.” 144 For purposes of Rule
23(a)(2), “[e]ven a single [common] question” will do.145
Although it is generally conceded that Wal-Mart raised the bar to
establish commonality, that decision has not changed the observation that the
“commonality test is easily met in most cases.” 146
B. Predominance
Under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must also show that “questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.” 147 Determining whether common questions
predominate over individual questions requires a “qualitative rather than []
quantitative” “pragmatic assessment of the entire action and all the issues
involved.” 148 As defined by the Tyson Court, “[a]n individual question is one
144

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.141, at 257 (2004).
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 376 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 176 n.110 (2003)); see FED. RULE CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s
notes to 1937 amendment (citing with approval cases in which “there was only a question of law
or fact common to” class members).
146
See 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:24, at 251 (5th
ed. 2011); supra note 24; see e.g., Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F.3d
426, 438 (7th Cir. 2015) (whether “subjective, discretionary decisions” were based on company
policy or practice); Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 903–17 (4th Cir. 2015) (whether
promotions were denied because of racial discrimination); Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 603 F.
App’x 538, 540 (9th Cir. 2015) (whether defect existed and whether defendant had duty to
disclose defect); Jimenez v. Allstate Ins., 765 F.3d 1161, 1164–66 (9th Cir. 2014) (whether claims
adjusters must be paid for off-the-clock overtime); Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750,
755–58 (7th Cir. 2014) (whether seller’s packaging likely to mislead reasonable consumer); In re
Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 809–12 (5th Cir. 2014) (whether class members suffered same
injury, even though injurious effects (damages) were diverse); Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc.,
731 F.3d 952, 957–63 (9th Cir. 2013) (whether security guards were required to work through
meal periods); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013) (whether
washing machines were defective); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab.
Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 858–61 (6th Cir. 2013) (whether product design defects caused mold,
mildew, and bacteria); Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 693 F.3d 532, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2012)
(whether insurers charged incorrect local tax on policyholders’ premiums); Ross v. RBS Citizens,
N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 908–10 (7th Cir. 2012) (whether bank broadly enforced policy denying
earned-overtime compensation), cert. granted, vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013).
147
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) was the “most adventuresome” addition to Rule 23
by the 1966 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Benjamin Kaplan, A Preparatory
Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969). “Rule 23(b)(3) added to the complexlitigation arsenal class actions for damages designed to secure judgments binding all class
members save those who affirmatively elected to be excluded.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 614–15 (1997).
148
Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 2014); DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE ET
AL., 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.45[1], at 23–215 (3d ed. 2016); see, e.g., Parko, 739
F.3d at 1085; Stillmock v. Weis Markets, Inc., 385 F. App’x 267, 273 (4th Cir. 2010); Vinole v.
145
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where ‘members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies
from member to member’ while a common question is one where ‘the same
evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the
issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.’”149
As instructed by the Supreme Court in Erica P. John Fund,
“[c]onsidering whether ‘questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate’ begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of
action.”150 A federal district court must identify the relevant factual and legal
issues and “compare the issues subject to common proof against the issues
subject solely to individualized proof.”151 As previously noted, the
predominance inquiry thus “generally involves considerations that are
enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s causes of
action.”152
After “careful scrutiny” of “the relation between common and individual
questions,” a federal district court must decide “whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”153 “Even if
Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement may be satisfied by [class members’]
shared experience, the predominance criterion is far more demanding.” 154
“The predominance inquiry ‘asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling
issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common,
aggregation-defeating, individual issues.’”155
There is no litmus test. Some federal courts consider whether issues
“that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a
whole, . . . predominate over those issues that are subject only to

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Mohawk Indus.,
Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2009); In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d
219, 227–29 (2d Cir. 2006).
149
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 4:50, at 196–97 (5th ed. 2012)).
150
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809 (2011) (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(b)(3)); see supra note 13.
151
2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:50, at 197 (5th ed.
2012).
152
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013) (citation omitted); see supra note 13;
Taha v. County of Bucks, 862 F.3d 292, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Clearly, the trier of fact should
be able to determine whether a violation was ‘willful’ [“only remaining question of fact”] by
considering common evidence regarding defendants’ actions and intent without taking into
account information regarding the individual class members.”); see also supra note 140 and
accompanying text.
153
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.
154
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623–24. Note that “[p]redominance is a test readily met in certain
cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws.” Id. at 625 (citing
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1937 amendment).
155
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 4:49, at 195–96 (5th ed. 2012)).
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individualized proof.”156 Others focus on whether the substantive elements of
class members’ claims require the same proof for each class member. 157 And
others regard whether one or more common issues constitute significant
elements of each class member’s individual claims or are a significant aspect
of a case. 158 Still others consider whether common issues are “more
substantial than the issues subject only to individualized proof.” 159 Some
courts also assess judicial resources and the parties’ litigation expenses to
decide whether it would be more efficient to determine one or more issues on
a classwide basis rather than to adjudicate all issues in separate
proceedings. 160
Rule 23(b)(3) “does not require a plaintiff seeking class certification to
prove that each element of her claim is susceptible to classwide proof,” only
that common questions “predominate over any questions affecting only
individual class members.” 161 If questions affecting individual class members
do not “overwhelm common ones,” the class is “sufficiently cohesive to
warrant adjudication by representation.” 162
Importantly, “Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common
to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the
merits, in favor of the class.” 163 As the Supreme Court observed in Amgen, a
plaintiff seeking Rule 23(b)(3) class certification does not need to “first
establish that it will win the fray” because that would be “put[ting] the cart
before the horse.”164 The Court explained, “the office of a Rule 23(b)(3)
certification ruling is not to adjudicate the case; rather, it is to select the
‘metho[d]’ best suited to adjudication of the controversy ‘fairly and
efficiently.’” 165
Moreover, “[h]ow many (if any) of the class members have a valid claim
is the issue to be determined after the class is certified.” 166 Indeed, if plaintiffs
satisfy all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), a class may be
certified even if none of the putative class members ultimately recovers,
156
Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 483 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
157
See, e.g., Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 2013); Rosario v.
Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992).
158
See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 815 (7th Cir. 2012);
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470–71 (5th Cir. 1986).
159
Mazzei v. Money Store, 829 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
160
See, e.g., Butler, 727 F.3d at 798.
161
Amgen, 568 U.S. at 469 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
162
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2412 (2014); Amchem, 521 U.S. at
623.
163
Amgen, 568 U.S. at 459.
164
Id. at 460.
165
Id. (paraphrasing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
166
Parko, 739 F.3d at 1085.
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either because class defendant prevails on the merits of a classwide
dispositive issue, or because class members’ claims ultimately fail for
different reasons.167
Our proposal to determine class members’ individual damages by
following a statistically-based sampling method would resolve a “common
contention” “in one stroke” because “the same evidence will suffice for each
member to make a prima facie showing” of individual damages and the
damages issues would be “susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.” 168
Unless classwide liability issues are subject to individualized proof, and those
issues “are more prevalent or important” than damages issues, the
determination of individual damages will predominate. 169 Historically,
however, many putative class actions fail because they cannot satisfy the
predominance prerequisite.170

167

Amgen, 568 U.S. at 470 & n.5; see, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d at 1245,
1254 (10th Cir. 2014); DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010);
Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2009); Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 148 F.3d 283, 307 (3d Cir. 1998).
If a class is certified and it is thereafter discovered that some class members do not have valid
claims against the class defendant, a federal district court can alter or amend its certification order
to narrow or refine the definition of the class. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that
grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”); cf. Kohen,
571 F.3d at 677 (suggesting random selection of class members to prove whether large numbers
did not suffer from alleged securities laws violations and that “a class will often include persons
who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct . . . . [s]uch a possibility or indeed
inevitability does not preclude class certification”).
A federal district court can also grant summary judgment in favor of the class defendant on
uninjured class members’ claims, see Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1047 (noting that where there is “[an
alleged] failure of proof as to an element of the plaintiffs’ cause of action—courts should engage
that question as a matter of summary judgment, not class certification” (quoting Nagareda, supra
note 83, at 107)); Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 824 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2016)
(noting that “alleged failure of proof” should be decided through dispositive motion, “not class
certification”), or instruct the jury not to base any damages awards on such claims, see Tyson, 136
S. Ct. at 1044–45.
168
See Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 4:50, at 196–97 (5th ed. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wal-Mart,
564 U.S. at 349–50 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157).
169
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
170
See, e.g., Arnold v. Direct TV, LLC, Case No. 4:10-CV-352-JAR, 2017 WL 1251033, at
*7, 12 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Plaintiffs’ proposed damages analysis cannot be performed on
a classwide basis. . . . Plaintiffs here have insufficient records to establish their individualized
unreported work time.”); Local 589 v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 13-cv-11455-ADB, 2016
WL 5109508, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 20, 2016) (“individual liability and damages, which will be a
highly individualized undertaking”); Perez v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 14-cv-0989-PJH, 2016 WL
4180190, at *8–11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (liability cannot “be established in the absence of
individualized inquiries”); Atkins v. United States, No. 4:15 CV 933 CDP, 2016 WL 3878466, at
*5 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2016) (questioning use of “representative samplings” and finding no
predominance of common issues “given the proposed development of adequate, individualized
evidence”); Benedict v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 314 F.R.D. 457, 477 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding there
was no “common proof” to determine whether employees qualified for FLSA exemption).
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C. Superiority
To certify a damages class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), a federal
district court must also find that “a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 171
Rule 23(b)(3) identifies four non-exclusive factors that pertain to a
superiority finding: “the class members’ interests in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions”; “the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class
members”; “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum”; and “the likely difficulties in managing a
class action.”172
The manageability factor is the one most heavily litigated and the one
most germane to the use of sampling evidence. 173 Ceteris paribus, as the size
of the putative class increases, the potential efficiency, and hence superiority,
of a class action increases, especially if there are truly common questions.
The goals of the predominance and superiority prerequisites are to
“achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity
of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.”174 There should be no
doubt that our proposal would achieve the economy goals and promote
uniform individual damages awards for similarly situated class members.
171

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). “[O]ther available methods” may include individual actions,
joinder of claims, or “test” or “bellwether” trials, among others. See generally 2 WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:85–4:88, at 357–74 (5th ed. 2012).
Typically, federal courts consider the manageability of a class action relative to alternative
methods of adjudication and are usually reluctant to deny class certification on this ground. See,
e.g., Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514–15 (9th Cir. 2013); Klay v. Humana, Inc.,
382 F.3d 1241, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bridge v. Phx.
Bond & Indem., Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008).
Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions are often superior to other available methods of
adjudication in “negative value cases,” cases involving numerous individuals with small damages
claims that, absent a class action or other form of aggregate adjudication, would have no remedies.
See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616–17; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809
(1985); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); Carnegie v. Household Int’l
Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions are also usually a
more efficient and economical method to adjudicate numerous claims based on the same or similar
causes of action, for example, mass torts. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 860–
61 (1999); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454, 466–67 n.12 (1975); Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974).
172
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D); see Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70,
82 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that, although the structure of Rule 23(b)(3) suggests that the factors
apply to both the predominance and superiority prerequisites, the factors “more clearly implicate
the superiority inquiry”).
173
For discussions of all four factors, see COQUILLETTE ET AL., supra note 148,
§§ 23.46[2][a]–3[c] at 23-272–23-294.
174
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966
amendment) (alterations in the original).
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And, because we advocate following our method only when judgment
variability, the randomness that each class member’s damages claim is
already exposed to, exceeds claim variability, the substantive differences
among the class members’ damages claims, no procedural fairness would be
sacrificed.175
One “matter[] pertinent to these findings [predominance and superiority]
include[s] . . . the likely difficulties in managing a class action.”176 In opposing
class certification, defendant will often argue that, even if liability to the class
is a common question, the determinations of what, if any, damages are owed to
the class as a whole or to its individual members are complex and factspecific, rendering class proceedings unmanageable. 177
D. Aggregate Damages and Individual Damages
When considering Rule 23(b)(3) classwide damages issues, aggregate
damages and individual damages should be distinguished. Aggregate
damages are the total amount of damages that the class defendant, if found
liable, pays the entire class. Individual damages are the separate portions of
that total amount that each class member with a valid claim is awarded in
damages. 178
Arguments about damages often arise at the class certification stage
because plaintiffs must demonstrate that one or more common issues
predominate over individual ones. To attempt to defeat certification of a Rule
23(b)(3) damages class, a defendant will often argue that individual damages
calculations predominate over common liability issues. By citing and quoting
approvingly a leading treatise, the Tyson Court put to rest an issue that had
perplexed federal courts: whether the need to prove individual damages
precludes Rule 23(b)(3) class certification. It ruled:
When “one or more of the central issues in the action are common
to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be
175

See infra notes 249–262 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
177
See, e.g., Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n effort
to determine a million consumers’ individual losses would make the suit unmanageable.”);
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“Because injury determinations must be made on an individual basis in this case, adjudicating the
claims as a class will not reduce litigation or save scarce judicial resources.”); Rutstein v. Avis
Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2000) (damages claims “focus almost
entirely on facts and issues specific to individuals rather than the class as a whole” (citation and
quotation marks omitted)); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“[I]ndividualized monetary damages determinations for more than a thousand potential plaintiffs
would require multiple juries . . . . [and] implicated significant . . . efficiency, and manageability
problems.”).
178
See generally 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:1–
12:5, at 89–120 (5th ed. 2014).
176
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considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important
matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages . . .
peculiar to some individual class members.” 179
Indeed, “[r]ecognition that individual damages calculations do not
preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.”180
Thus, it is now clear that classwide liability may be adjudicated and individual
damages determined, if necessary, in later proceedings. 181 That said, before

179

Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045. (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 7AA FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE § 1778, at 123–24 (3d ed. 2005)); see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (“[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of
similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so
despite the need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the damages suffered by
individuals within the class.”); Day v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d 817, 833 (8th Cir.
2016) (quoting Tyson).
180
Comcast, 569 U.S. at 42 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citing 2 WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:54, at 205 (5th ed. 2012)); see, e.g.,
Roach 778 F.3d at 405; Levya, 716 F.3d at 513–14; In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461
F.3d at 227; Klay, 382 F.3d at 1259–60; Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 428–30
(4th Cir. 2003); Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003); Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988).
181
See, e.g., McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 807 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2015) (“It is
well established that, if a case requires determinations of individual issues of causation and
damages, a court may bifurcate the case into a liability phase and a damages phase.” (citations
omitted)); Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 374–75 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is ‘a
misreading of Comcast’ to interpret it as ‘preclud[ing] certification under Rule 23(b)(3) in any
case where the class members’ damages are not susceptible to a formula for classwide
measurement.’” (quoting In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 815 & n.104)); Roach, 778 F.3d at
402 (“We hold that Comcast does not mandate that certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) requires
a finding that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.”); In re Urethane
Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d at 1257–58 (“[W]e know from the actual trial that individualized issues
did not predominate.”); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 817 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Even after
Comcast, the predominance inquiry can still be satisfied under Rule 23(b)(3) if the proceedings
are structured to establish ‘liability on a class-wide basis, with separate hearings to determine—if
liability is established—the damages of individual class members.’” (citations omitted)); In re
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 860–61 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“[D]istrict court certified only a liability class and reserved all issues concerning damages for
individual determination.”); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d
6, 28–30 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that “[p]redominance is not defeated by individual damages
questions as long as liability is still subject to common proof,” and vacating and remanding class
certification order, in part, to reconsider liability issues); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 273
& n.11 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming Rule 23(c)(4)(A) issues class despite “think[ing] it unlikely that
the calculation of damages will be suitable for class determination”); Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383
F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming Rule 23(b)(3) class certification for common liability
issues and noting that federal district court can bifurcate liability issues from damages issues); In
re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing
“management tools available to a district court to address any individualized damages issues”); In
re Simply Orange Juice Mkting. & Sales Prac., Master Case No. 4:12-md-02361-FJG, 2017 WL
3142095, at *7-9 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 2017) (finding damages cannot be established through
common evidence, but certifying liability issues class under Rule 23(c)(4)).
AND
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certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class, a federal district court must still weigh
whether individual damages issues will overwhelm common liability issues.182
Plaintiff may argue that, even without a proposal regarding how to
determine individual damages, the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance prerequisite
is met by a trial plan to prove aggregate damages. 183 Defendant, while still
182

See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1973)) (rejecting “fluid recovery” whereby
“aggregate liability” would initially be determined and then distributed “usually through a
simplified proof of claim procedure”); Klay, 382 F.3d at 1260 (affirming Rule 23(b)(3) class
certification, but noting “[i]t is primarily when there are significant individualized questions going
to liability that the need for individualized assessments of damages is enough to preclude [Rule]
23(b)(3) certification”).
183
See, e.g., Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l Paper Co., 831 F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting
as a matter of law that plaintiffs are obligated “to drill down and estimate each individual class
member’s damages” at class certification stage); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price
Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 197–98 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The use of aggregate damages calculations is well
established in federal court and implied by the very existence of the class action mechanism
itself.”); see also Hickory Sec. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 493 F. App’x 156, 160 (2d Cir.
2012) (remanding to federal district court to calculate “aggregate damage award [that] would
‘roughly reflect’ the loss to each [sub]class”); Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., Case No. 11-CV565-NJR-RJD, 2017 WL 3704206, at *14 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2017) (“[D]amages are capable of
being measured on a class-wide basis using” models.); In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig.,
MDL No. 2437, 13-md-2437, 2017 WL 3623466, at *46 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2017) (noting that
there is “no need to show individual damages for individual Plaintiffs” at class certification stage
and finding proposed model was sufficient “for classwide proof of measurable damages”); La.
Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., Case No. 2:11-cv-289,
2017 WL 3149424, at *6–7 (D. Vt. July 21, 2017) (stock price “event study” “methodology . . .
can be applied on a class-wide basis”); Gordon v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., Civ. No. 137175, 2017 WL 3116153, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 2017) (damages measurable on classwide basis);
In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2047, 2017 WL 1421627, at
*23 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2017) (“Plaintiffs have devised a reasonable and reliable solution to
calculate remediation damages on a class-wide basis and accommodate individual class damage
issues by shifting the individual damage components to subsequent adjudicative phases.”); In re
Dial Complete Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 320 F.R.D. 326, 337 (D.N.H. 2017) (proffered
calculation capable of establishing “full extent of damages on a class-wide basis”); Martin v.
Monsanto Co., No. ED CV 16-2168-JFW (SPx), 2017 WL 1115167, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24,
2017) (benefit-of-the-bargain model to determine total damages); Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral
Energy, LLC, No. CIV-11-0634-HE, 2017 WL 187542, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 17, 2017) (expert’s
model “can determine damages on a class wide basis”); Fond Du Lac Bumper Exch., Inc. v. Jui Li
Enter. Co., No. 09-CV-0852, 2016 WL 3579953, at *11 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 2016) (“[R]egression
analysis serves as a sufficiently reliable method for establishing that damages can be proven on a
class-wide basis.”).
Decisions holding that Rule 23(b)(3) prerequisites are satisfied by a trial plan to prove
aggregate damages find support from dicta in Comcast. The damages model that plaintiffs
proposed in Comcast did not purport to calculate damages suffered by each class member, and the
model was not challenged or rejected on that basis. The Supreme Court rejected the model finding
it did not satisfy the predominance standard of Rule 23(b)(3) because it “falls far short of
establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.” Comcast, 569 U.S. at
34. That is, the damages model failed to measure aggregate damages. Id. The Court stated that
“[w]ithout presenting another methodology, . . . [q]uestions of individual damage calculations will
inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.” Id. The negative implication of the Court’s
statement is that a damages model that could determine aggregate damages would have satisfied
the predominance prerequisite.
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asserting that common questions do not predominate over individual ones,
may counter that proving only aggregate damages is not sufficient to satisfy
Rule 23(b)(3) and may raise the possibility of numerous mini-trials to
calculate individual damages. Many federal courts have held that proof of
aggregate damages is sufficient for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification purposes
if plaintiff also proposes a common methodology to calculate individual
damages. 184
Alternatively, if aggregate damages cannot be proven, plaintiff may
argue that Rule 23(b)(3) prerequisites are still satisfied by proposing a
common methodology to determine individual damages. A leading treatise
states:
[T]he predominance inquiry is focused on . . . [whether] there must
be a single or common method that can be used to measure and
quantify the damages of each class member, lest individual
damages calculations predominate over common questions of
liability. The class proponents’ task, therefore, is to demonstrate a
method for quantifying individual damages that applies across the
board and hence is common to the class: a common classwide
method for calculating individual damages. 185
In many class actions, a common methodology to determine individual
damages exists. 186 On the other hand, several federal courts have denied Rule
184
See, e.g., Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79, 106 (2d Cir. 2017) (damages for
individual class members could be calculated by applying a method across the entire class); In re
Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., No. 1:10 M D 2196-JZ, 2015 WL 4459636, at *8 (N.D. Ohio
Jul. 21, 2015) (“A well-designed claims process can ensure each class member receives damage
payments only if and as appropriate.”); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 297 F.R.D.
168, 183 (D. Mass. 2013) (“[T]wo sets of common damages are calculated and presented under a
reasonable and judicially acceptable methodology.”); In re Neurontin Antitrust Litig., Nos. 021830-FSH, 02-2731-FSH, 2011 WL 286118, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan 25, 2011) (“[A]t class
certification, Plaintiffs need only demonstrate that they have a ‘viable method’ for calculating
damages that is common to the class.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 297, 323–
24 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“yardsticks” available to measure drug overprices).
185
4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:4, at 110–11 (5th
ed. 2014) (footnotes omitted); see Lambert v. Nutraceutical Corp., 870 F.3d 1170, 1182 (9th Cir.
2017) (“Uncertainty regarding class members’ damages does not prevent certification of a class as
long as a valid method has been proposed for calculating those damages.”).
186
See, e.g., Butler, 727 F.3d at 801 (post-Comcast remand affirming certification of liability
only class and noting “damages of individual class members can be readily determined in
individual hearings, in settlement negotiations, or by creation of subclasses”); Leyva, 716 F.3d at
514 (reversing denial of Rule 23(b)(3) class certification because defendant’s “computerized
payroll and time-keeping database would enable the court to accurately calculate damages and
related penalties for each claim”); Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364,
372 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing cases) (“Should it appear that the calculation of monetary relief will be
mechanical, formulaic, a task not for a trier of fact but for a computer program . . . the district
court can award that relief without terminating the class action and leaving the class members to
their own devices . . . .”); Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010)
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(identical formula could be used for all class members); Similow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc.,
323 F.3d 32, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2003) (computer program could calculate damages for cellphone
users allegedly overcharged for incoming calls); Leon v. Diversified Concrete, LLC, No. 15-6301CJB, 2016 WL 6247674, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2016) (statutory damages awards); Hurt v.
Commerce Energy, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00758-JSG, 2015 WL 1298674, at *2 & n.20 (N.D. Ohio
2015) (“[A]lthough the damages would be unique for each class member, they would all be
determined by applying a consistent methodology—a mathematical formula based on the number
of hours worked and the amount of wages already earned.”); Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp.,
297 F.R.D. 431, 456 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (Rule 23(b)(3) settlement with personnel and payroll
records to determine each class member’s damages); Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360, 393
(D. Ariz. 2013), amended in part sub nom. Estrada v. Bashas’, Inc., 2014 WL 1319189 (D. Ariz.
2014) (demonstrating model for calculating backpay “through a computer program, and relying
upon ‘objective factors’ such as ‘the individual employee payroll record (dates of employment[,]
job position, hours worked) and the wage scale,’. . . plaintiffs will be able to calculate back pay
losses for ‘each eligible class member’”); In re Diamond Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., 295 F.R.D. 240,
252 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[C]omputing individual damages will be virtually a mechanical task.”
(quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975)); In re Checking Account
Overdraft Litig., 286 F.R.D. 645, 658 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (damages “ministerial[ly]” calculated using
class defendant’s records); Meijer, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co. III, Ltd., 246 F.R.D. 293,
311–13 (D.D.C. 2007) (overcharges “will be readily susceptible to formulaic analysis that does
not require individualized inquiry as to each Class member”).
For post-Tyson decisions where federal district courts endorsed common methodologies to
assess individual damages, see, for example, Snipes v. Dollar Tree Distribution, Inc., No. 2:15-cv00878-MCE-DB, 2017 WL 5754894, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017) (valid statistical method for
calculating classwide damages); Luna v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. C 15-05447 WHA, 2017
WL 4865559, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2017) (event study on market efficiency to calculate
classwide damages); Johnson v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 15-cv-04138-WHO, 2017 WL
2224828, at *16 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2017) (damages measured based on defendant’s records);
Cazares v. AVA Rest. Corp., 15-CV-0477(KAM)(RML), 2017 WL 1229727, at *8 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2017) (“[D]etermining damages . . . would be a matter of performing simple arithmetic
using the data defendants have produced.”); Kramer v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 11 C 8758, 2017
WL 1196965, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Plaintiffs propose a class-wide method of
calculating damages, based on the hours that an individual class member worked . . . .”); Herman
v. Seaworld Parks & Entm’t, Inc., Case No. 8:14-cv-3028-MSS-JSS, 2017 WL 1304302, at *18
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2017) (statutory damages “can be easily calculated utilizing class-wide data
available from” defendant); Balderrama-Baca v. Clarence Davids & Co., 318 F.R.D. 603, 613–14
(N.D. Ill. 2017) (“calculating individual damages will be a simple ministerial matter of gathering
employee pay records” and applying “statutory damages formula”); Durant v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. No. 2-15-CV-01710-RAJ, 2017 WL 950588, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2017)
(“able to calculate the [individualized] damages based on the submitted records”); McCurdy v.
Prof’l Credit Serv., No. 6:15-cv-01498-AA, 2016 WL 5853721, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 3, 2016)
(statutory damages); Kempen v. Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc., No. 15-cv-00660-HSG, 2016 WL
4073336, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (class members’ payments calculated formulaically);
Sibley v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 315 F.R.D. 642, 662–63 (D. Kan. 2016) (plaintiffs’ experts supplied
“a ‘fancy’ computerized commission-calculation model to quantify individual damages for each
class-member plaintiff”); In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2672 CRB (JSC), 2016 WL 4010049, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2016) (remedies
consisted of only two options); Manouchehri v. Styles for Less, Inc., No. 14 cv 2521 NLS, 2016
WL 3387473, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 20, 2016) (damages “can be calculated using a common
methodology of calculation”); Jimenez v. Menzies Aviation, Inc., No. 15-cv-02392-WHO, 2016
WL 3231106, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (“[U]niform pay stubs can serve as a common
form of proof . . . .”); Nitsch v. Dreamworks Animation SKG, Inc., 315 F.R.D. 270, 304 (N.D.
Cal. 2016) (“[C]ommon evidence and a regression analysis could be used to create a model for
quantifying the estimated cost to class members resulting from Defendants’ challenged conduct.”);
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23(b)(3) class certification where individual damages could not be computed
formulaically. 187 Others, however, have held that the failure to propose a
model to determine individual damages does not defeat predominance. 188
The message to proponents of statistical evidence is that the evidence
must demonstrate how and why the evidence is both relevant and reliable to
prove either classwide liability, or aggregate damages or individual damages.

Harper v. Law Office of Harris & Zyde LLP, No. 15-cv-0114-HS6, 2016 WL 2344194, at *5
(N.D. Cal. May 4, 2016) (putative class seeking only statutory damages, therefore, there were no
“individual questions in this action”); Chastain v. Cam, No. 3:13-cv-01802-SI, 2016 WL 1572542,
at *9 (D. Or. Apr. 19, 2016) (“[O]bjective factors such as payroll records will allow for damage
calculations on a class-wide basis.”); Dekeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 449,
455 (E.D. Wisc. 2016) (damages would involve “mere mathematical computations”); cf. In re Dial
Complete Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 312 F.R.D. 36, 77 (D.N.H. 2015) (“[P]laintiffs have
provided insufficient detail regarding their proposed methodologies for calculating classwide
damages.”); Weidenhamer v. Expedia, Inc., No. C14-1239-RAJ, 2015 WL 7157282, at *15 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 13, 2015) (“[F]ailure to present a model or other method of evaluating class-wide
injury weighs against a finding that common issues predominate.”).
187
See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 2006)
(noting that it was “clear from the record that the damages claims . . . are not subject to any sort of
formulaic calculation”); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 570 (8th Cir. 2005) (no “reliable
methodology to determine the premiums paid”); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d
294, 307 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Class treatment, . . . may not be suitable where the calculation of
damages is not susceptible to a mathematical or formulaic calculation . . . .”); Sikes v. Teleline,
Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1366 (11th Cir. 2002) (“extensive individualized inquiries on the issues of
injury and damages”), abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553
U.S. 639 (2008); Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 66–67 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc)
(“The claims could not be proved by any set method of mathematical or formula calculation but
would require individual proof and trial . . . .”); Little v. Wash. Metro. Area Trans. Auth., Civil
Action No. 14-1289 (RMC), 2017 WL 1403122, at *22 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2017) (no “formulaic
approach for determining class-wide damages”).
In Amchem, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court improperly certified asbestosrelated personal injury claims because the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance prerequisite was not
satisfied. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625. In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), the Court
disallowed a proposed class action settlement in another asbestos case, purportedly brought under
the limited fund provision of Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Amchem and Ortiz may indicate that mass tort
cases involving damages claims for personal injuries are unlikely to be certified as class actions.
Conversely, when a single accident gives rise to common liability and causation issues, those
issues may predominate over individual damages issues. See, e.g., Mullen v. Treasure Chest
Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[P]utative class members are all symptomatic
by definition and claim injury from the same defective ventilation system over the same general
period of time.”); cf. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 815–20 (affirming settlement class
certification for “economic loss and property damage”). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (“A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous
persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be present,
affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally
as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.” (citations
omitted)).
188
See, e.g., Roach, 778 F.3d at 408–09.
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Moreover, the proffered statistical evidence must tend to prove “common,
aggregation-enabling, issues.” 189
As we will soon demonstrate, the sampling evidence we propose is both
relevant and reliable and proves each class member’s individual damages. 190
As such, it is probative regarding “common, aggregation-enabling, issues.”
E. Bifurcation
Although there must be at least one common issue for a case to be
certified as a class action, typically there are individual issues as well. 191 In
those rarer cases that only raise issues that are shared by all class members,
there is no need for individual proofs, and a unitary trial is held.192 In many
situations, however, a trial is bifurcated and common issues (often liability
issues) are resolved in the trial’s first phase and individual issues (frequently
damages issues) are adjudicated in the trial’s second phase. 193 As a popular
treatise explains:
189

Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 4:50, at 196–97 (5th ed. 2012)).
190
One federal district court has concluded that, “at a minimum, reliability under Rule 23 is a
higher standard than reliability under Daubert.” In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.,
MDL Dock. No. 1869, Misc. No. 07-0489 (PLF), 2017 WL 5311533, at *50 (D.D.C. Nov. 13,
2017) (citations omitted). The court opined that, because it “must resolve expert disputes that bear
on class certification. . . . [t]his may require evaluating the conclusions and results of competing
experts, which goes beyond the scope of the Daubert inquiry.” Id. The court continued that a
“‘rigorous analysis’ of whether plaintiffs have established predominance is certainly a more indepth inquiry than required under Daubert.” Id.
191
As discussed previously in Part III, for a case to proceed as a money damages class action
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), common issues must predominate over individual ones and the class
action device must be superior to other available methods of adjudication. See supra notes 147–
177 and accompanying text.
192
The prototypical case is one where liability is based on defendant’s conduct and the class
is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) (“[T]he party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole.”). See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment
(“[i]llustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with
discriminating unlawfully against a class,” retailers against a seller based on illegal price
discrimination, and purchasers or licensees against a patentee based on illegal “tying” conditions).
193
See, e.g., Vaquero, 824 F.3d at 1153–55 (affirming Rule 23(b)(3) class certification on
liability issues where plaintiff “proposed to resolve the damages phase . . . through use of a
survey, sampling evidence, or a special master”); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer
Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d at 860–61 (post-Comcast remand; affirming certification of liability
only class and “reserv[ing] all issues concerning damages for individual determination”); Sellars
v. CRST Expedited, Inc., No. C15-117-LTS, 2017 WL 1193730, at *23–24 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 30,
2017) (bifurcation; “common issues as to liability will predominate over individual issues,” but
“individualized questions will predominate” regarding “hostile work environment claim and
damages as to both claims”); St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, No. 05-1119 L, 2016 WL
2641792, at *25–26 (Ct. Cl. May 4, 2016) (accepting “representative evidence” on liability
issues); Melgar v. Zicam LLC, No. 2:14-CV-00160-MCE-AC, 2016 WL 1267870, at *5 (E.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 2016) (common issues “more prevalent or important” than individual issues
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In class action cases, this familiar split serves a particularly
important function: because the defendant’s liability is an issue that
likely applies to all class members’ claims, while damages may be
individualized, bifurcation often enables a case to proceed as a
class action by ensuring that the common liability issues
predominate while the individualized damages issues are addressed
in some other manageable fashion. 194
Furthermore, bifurcation of common issues from individual issues “insulates
a party from the possible prejudice of jointly trying certain issues.”195 For this
and other reasons, bifurcation is ordered in a wide variety of contexts. 196

regarding damages or alleged misrepresentations); Petersen v. Costco Wholesale Co., 312 F.R.D.
565, 579 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“liability-only class, reserving for a second phase of trial the issue of
damages”); Rollins v. Taylor Bros., Inc., No. C14-1414-JCC, 2016 WL 258523, at *7–12 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 21, 2016) (bifurcated trial; first phase for disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims and punitive damages and second phase for “backpay or particularized injunctive relief and
compensatory damages, as well as the individual’s share of any punitive damages”); Lilly v.
Jamba Juice Co., No. 13-cv-02998-JST, 2015 WL 1248027, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015)
(preliminary approval of class settlement of liability issues only).
Class actions may also be split into separate issues, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (“When
appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues.”); see 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 4:89–4:92, at
375–96 (5th ed. 2012), or subclasses, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (“When appropriate, a class may be
divided into subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.”); see 3 WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §§ 7.29–7:32, at 148–66 (5th ed. 2013).
194
4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:3, at 9 (5th ed.
2014) (citations omitted); see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.631, at 121–22
(2004) (“[T]he judge may consider severing for a joint trial those issues on which common
evidence predominates, reserving noncommon issues for subsequent individual trials.”). But see
Ebert v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472, 479 (8th Cir. 2016) (reversing Rule 23(b)(3) class
certification because federal district court eliminated “any efficiencies gained by the class
proceeding because many individual issues [e.g., “property-by-property assessment”] will require
trial”).
195
4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:4, at 13 (5th ed.
2014). A federal district court can also address individual issues by “appointing a magistrate judge
or special master to preside over individual damages proceedings,” “decertifying the class after the
liability trial and providing notice to class members concerning how they may proceed to prove
damages,” “creating subclasses,” or “altering or amending the class.” In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.), overruled
on other grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006); see
Epenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 2013).
196
4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:4, at 15 (5th ed.
2014) (noting “trial bifurcation is widely accepted”); see, e.g., Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511
F.3d 554, 564–66 (6th Cir. 2007) (Federal Communications Act); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d
256, 273 (3d Cir. 2004) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Bertulli v. Indep. Ass’n of Cont’l Pilots,
242 F.3d 290, 298 (5th Cir. 2001) (Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and Railway
Labor Act).
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F. Sampling and Extrapolation
To address classwide damages issues raised at the class certification
stage, an innovative plaintiff should consider proposing to select a random
sample of class members’ damages claims for adjudications and then
extrapolate those results to the rest of the class. 197 As demonstrated in Part IV,
a properly devised sampling methodology can achieve the goals of Rule
23(b)(3) predominance and superiority: “economies of time, effort, and
expense,” while promoting “uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situated.” 198 Unquestionably, a federal district court has the authority to
entertain such a proposal. Rule 23(d)(1)(A) grants the court broad discretion
to “issue orders that . . . determine the course of [class action] proceedings or
prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in presenting
evidence or argument.” 199 A sampling procedure has obvious efficiency
benefits, as it obviates the need to expend resources trying numerous claims,
thereby reducing the parties’ transaction costs, as well as conserving valuable
judicial resources.
Moreover, as also demonstrated in Part IV, if a proper statistical
methodology is followed, sampling may also produce more accurate and
more reliable results than those produced by separate adjudications of each
class member’s damages claim. 200
197

One or more “bellwether” trials may be held to inform the parties and the court. 4
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:11–11:20, at 41–70 (5th ed.
2014). “Bellwether” refers to:
[A] sheep that leads a flock, around whose neck a bell is hung. In a bellwether trial
procedure, a random sample of cases large enough to yield reliable results is tried to
a jury. A judge, jury, or participating lawyers use the resulting verdicts as a basis for
resolving the remaining cases. Judges currently use bellwether trials informally in
mass tort litigation to assist in valuing cases and to encourage settlement.
Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577–78 (2008) (citations
omitted). As the author points out, “[t]he central difficulty of bellwether trials is the reference
class problem . . . . caused by heterogeneity within the group of plaintiffs to whom bellwether
verdicts are to be extrapolated.” Id. at 605 (citing Mark Colyvan et al., Is It a Crime to Belong to a
Reference Class?, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 168, 172 (2001)).
198
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966
amendment); cf. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 278 F.R.D. 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2011) (selecting nonrandom sample of class members, up to fifteen selected by each side, to determine aggregate
damages).
199
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(A).
200
See Hillel J. Bavli, Aggregating for Accuracy: A Closer Look at Sampling and Accuracy in
Class Action Litigation, 14 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 67, 69, 78–83 (2015) [hereinafter
Aggregating for Accuracy] (deriving “conditions under which sampling will increase accuracy”);
Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 597 (2012) (“The
practice of informal sampling in aggregate litigation demonstrates that in being forced to give
reasons for how similarly situated people are treated, adjudicators produce a system that is fairer
across the board than individual, decentralized litigation.”); Michael J. Saks & Peter David
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of
Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 833, 851 (1992) (arguing that “[a]ggregation, properly
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As one commentator explained:
For statistical evidence, [“the reason why the sample average is
allowed to affect or control outcomes”] is to achieve the best
possible jury or judge determination of the relevant issue based on
the facts of an individual case. Since the aim is to get as close to the
right decision as possible, the focus is on the probative value of the
sample average compared to other available evidence.201
However, as the brief bleak history of sampling evidence in class actions
reveals, supra Part I, few federal courts have allowed this form of statistical
evidence to prove classwide issues. But, as suggested supra Part II, the fault
often lies not with the reliability and fairness of the methodology, but rather
with its improper application. By way of examples only, courts have properly
rejected statistical evidence that does not conform to rigorous scientific
standards.202
conducted, will provide awards that are more accurate, not less” and that aggregation “can
systematically increase accuracy [and] reduce bias”); Lawrence Walker & John Monahan,
Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 567 (1998) (noting “[t]he availability of highly
efficient survey techniques for proving damages would open the door to certification of many
proposed mass tort class actions”); Lawrence Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the
Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969, 988 (2007) (random sampling may produce “a more accurate
picture of the facts at issue than the study of each case one-by-one”); see also David Rosenberg, A
Sampling-Based System of Civil Liability, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 635, 649 (2014)
(“[W]hen deterrence motivates our desire for knowledge about defendants’ liability and damages,
then . . . ‘accuracy’ is as fully achieved by statistical, on-average aggregate assessments as by
particularistic, individualized determinations.”).
201
Bone, supra note 13, at 613.
202
See, e.g., DiCuio v. Brother Int’l Corp., 653 F. App’x 109, 112–14 (3d Cir. 2016)
(comparing Tyson and affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant in putative consumer
fraud class action where “a jury could [not] draw such an inference” based on plaintiffs’
“representative evidence”); Espenscheid, 705 F.3d at 774 (“There is no suggestion that sampling
methods used in statistical analysis were employed to create a random sample of class members to
be the witnesses, or more precisely random samples, each one composed of victims of a particular
type of alleged violation.”); Marlo v. UPS, Inc., 639 F.3d 942, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2011) (survey
designer “stated in her deposition that she did not know whether the sample was representative”),
for additional opinions, see 453 F. App’x 682 (9th Cir. 2011); Senne v. Kansas City Royals
Baseball Corp., 315 F.R.D. 523, 587–90 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (applying “‘tailored’ Daubert standard”
and excluding expert evidence supporting motion to certify Rule 23(b)(3) class because
methodology and survey results were “unreliable” due to “self-interest bias” among other things);
United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00604-M, 2016 WL 3449833,
at *13–14 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2016) (granting defendant summary judgment on all but one claim
because relator’s “statistical evidence,” including extrapolation, was “unreliable” and expert’s
analysis “deficient, because his methodology was fundamentally flawed” due to “failure to select a
random sample or to account for relevant variables”); In re Celexa & Lexapro Mktg., 315 F.R.D.
116, 127–28 (D. Mass. 2016) (denying Rule 23(b)(3) class certification in RICO case because of
“fundamental flaw” in plaintiff’s expert’s approach); Balasanyan v. Nordstrom, Inc., 294 F.R.D.
550, 568 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (“It is unclear whether the employees were randomly selected or even
whether the population of employees was statistically significant (assuming that the selection was
random, which, again, is unclear).”).
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In addition to obvious economies, the primary argument to admit
statistical evidence is that it assists the fact finder to determine a disputed
issue based on the facts of the case.
The most common and salient argument against a sampling methodology
is that extrapolating from adjudications of sample claims to non-adjudicated
claims introduces error.203 For example, although sampling may enable all
class members with valid claims to recover, it may result in over-recovery
and under-recovery, and allow class members to recover who do not have
valid claims. If all claims were separately adjudicated, the argument goes,
extrapolation error would be eliminated. This argument, however, ignores,
among other important things, that triers of fact, especially juries, introduce
error in the form of unpredictability. With proper sampling, such error can be
minimized. Thus, although sampling may introduce extrapolation error, it
reduces judgment variability. 204
In the end, “whether sampling or individual adjudication produces more
accurate results depends on the homogeneity of the group of cases and an
empirical question about jury behavior.” 205 In addition:
[A] sample picked randomly from the correct reference class will
yield fair results, so long as the extrapolation process is able to take
into account objectively verifiable variables and does not
systematically devalue certain categories of claims for socially
undesirable and legally impermissible reasons.206
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF SAMPLING EVIDENCE TO
PROVE INDIVIDUAL DAMAGES
A. Revisiting Tyson
In Tyson, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that “[o]ne way for
[plaintiffs] to show . . . that the sample relied upon . . . is a permissible
method of proving classwide liability is by showing that each class member
could have relied on that sample to establish liability if he or she had brought
an individual action.”207 The Court explained that, “[i]f the sample could have
sustained a reasonable jury finding as to hours worked in each employee’s
individual action, that sample is a permissible means of establishing the
203

Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, at 833.
See infra Part IV. See generally Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 75–78;
Edward K. Cheng, When 10 Trials Are Better Than 1000: An Evidentiary Perspective on Trial
Sampling, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 958–60 (2012); Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, at 833–37.
205
Cheng, supra note 204, at 960; see Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 78–83
(deriving homogeneity conditions necessary and sufficient to improve accuracy).
206
Lahav, supra note 200, at 617.
207
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016); id. at 1050 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring); id. at 1053 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
204
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employees’ hours worked in a class action.”208 By parallel reasoning,
sampling evidence is a permissible method of proving individual damages in
a class action if each class member could rely on it to establish damages in an
individual action. The admissibility of sampling evidence to prove individual
damages in a class action therefore depends on whether it is relevant and
reliable to prove damages in an individual action brought by any member of
the class.209
The relevance inquiry can be quickly and positively answered. As long
as sampling evidence is based on the facts of the case, that is, it “fit[s]” the
case, and there is “a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry,” for
example, individual damages, sampling evidence is relevant. 210 Assuming the
relevance of sampling evidence, we build on recent articles regarding
sampling and accuracy to show that, under appropriate circumstances,
sampling evidence is admissible to prove individual damages at the Rule
23(b)(3) class certification stage, even where individual damages claims are
known to be heterogeneous.
As discussed in Parts II and III, plaintiffs have attempted to introduce
sampling evidence to establish individual damages to satisfy the Rule
23(b)(3) predominance prerequisite. 211 Where individual damages cannot be
calculated formulaically, federal district courts frequently find that individual
issues predominate over common issues and deny Rule 23(b)(3) class
certification.212 But, if plaintiffs can demonstrate that sampling evidence
pertaining to the entire class can be reliably applied to determine individual
damages, then they should prevail in convincing a federal district court that
common issues predominate over individual ones.
Consider the circumstances in Tyson. Plaintiffs proposed a method to
calculate classwide liability and aggregate damages. Tyson argued that
plaintiffs’ expert’s study was “unrepresentative or inaccurate.”213 As
explained below, in such circumstances, class plaintiffs can counter by
arguing that sampling evidence (similar to that introduced in Tyson) can not
only reliably prove classwide liability and aggregate damages, but can
determine individual damages as well.
Assume that videotaped observations of a representative sample of
workers in the class reveal that each sampled worker spends approximately
twenty minutes “donning” and “doffing” safety gear and that “donning” and
“doffing” times are the only factor that distinguishes one class member’s

208

Id. at 1046-47.
See id; supra notes 82–137 and accompanying text.
210
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 591–92 (1993).
211
See supra notes 178–189 and accompanying text.
212
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
213
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1047.
209
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damages claim from another. 214 Plaintiffs may persuasively argue, relying on
Tyson, that expert testimony regarding the sampling evidence is reliable to
establish damages for each class member and is admissible to prove
individual damages. Therefore, the sampling evidence would also be
admissible to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance prerequisite.215
Now, assume that the videotaped observations disclose more variability
among the sampled workers’ “donning” and “doffing” times. In that case, the
pertinent question is: How variable is too variable? Or, in other words, what
degree of homogeneity should be required to demonstrate that sampling
evidence is reliable to prove individual damages? For example, what variance
of “donning” and “doffing” times should be acceptable for a federal district
court to admit the sampling evidence to prove individual damages?
It is important to keep in mind that a federal district court ruling on the
admissibility of sampling evidence is not deciding whether the finder of fact
must rely on it, or, for example, the sample mean in particular, to calculate
individual damages for each class member. Rather, the court is only deciding
whether the sampling evidence is sufficiently reliable to present to the trier of
fact for consideration when awarding individual damages. 216 Ignoring, for
now, the possibility that some class members do not have valid claims
because they did not work in excess of forty hours in a week, that is, they
cannot prove that the class defendant is liable to them, we posit that, at some
level of homogeneity, the sampling evidence is reliable and therefore is
admissible into evidence to prove individual damages.
We will demonstrate below that one method to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance, notwithstanding variable individual damages, is to show: (1) a
sample of class members’ claims is representative and provides reliable
measures of central tendency and variability; and (2) individual damages are
not too variable. We assume that plaintiffs will propose a sampling method
“ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of science” to meet the first
criterion.217 Therefore, we now address the second criterion, and determine
how variable is too variable.

214
Alternatively, consider circumstances where “donning” and “doffing” times are found by a
court, acting as the finder of fact, to be homogeneous. For example, if a federal district court finds,
based on sampling evidence, that most workers perform “donning” and “doffing” activities in
twenty minutes, and that that is also approximately the minimum “donning” and “doffing” time in
the sample, the court could find that more than twenty minutes is unreasonable, and use twenty
minutes as the basis for calculating individual damages.
215
See supra notes 82–206 and accompanying text.
216
See generally Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1036.
217
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. The “principles and methods” of sampling are generally
recognized “methods and procedures of science.” FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590;
see supra notes 138–206 and accompanying text.
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B. Threshold for Homogeneity
We derive a threshold for determining whether class damages claims are
sufficiently homogeneous to justify the admissibility of sampling evidence to
prove individual damages. We begin by developing a framework for our
analysis by defining the concepts of judgment variability, claim variability,
and the accuracy of damages awards. We argue that, for purposes of
satisfying the predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3), accuracy is an
appropriate standard for evidentiary reliability. Then, we show that, when
judgment variability exceeds claim variability, sampling evidence improves
accuracy and thereby establishes evidentiary reliability.
C. Claim Variability and Judgment Variability
In a recent article, one of the authors described the concepts of claim
variability and judgment variability. As defined, claim variability represents
the substantive, that is, factual, differences among a set of claims. Judgment
variability, on the other hand, is the randomness associated with the
adjudication of a claim, or specifically, the differences in the outcomes that
would result from repeated adjudications of the same claim. 218 Thus, for
present purposes, we postulate that, if each class member’s damages claim
were adjudicated individually, the variability of the resulting damages awards
could be attributed to both claim variability and judgment variability. To refine
the inquiry addressed here: What threshold amount of claim variability is
acceptable for sampling evidence to be admissible to prove individual
damages?
D. Variability, Accuracy, and Evidentiary Reliability
As discussed in Part II, among the “general standards” that a federal
district court “must use to assess the reliability . . . of proffered expert
testimony,” are whether the “testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods” and whether the “expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.” 219 According to the Daubert Court,
evidentiary reliability means “trustworthiness” and, “[i]n a case involving
scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific

218
Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 75–78; see Hillel J. Bavli, Sampling and
Reliability in Class Action Litigation, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 207, 209–10, http://
cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/BAVLI_2016_207.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ5F-GG7N];
Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, at 833–37.
219
FED. R. EVID. 702; FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment; see
supra notes 138–206 and accompanying text.
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validity.”220 In turn, scientific validity is an affirmative answer to the question:
“[D]oes the principle support what it purports to show?”221
In the context of sampling to determine individual damages for Rule
23(b)(3) class members (and, likely, in most contexts), evidentiary reliability
can be best understood in terms of accuracy: Does the sampling evidence
produce a more accurate determination of individual damages?
More formally, assume that, for each class member’s claim, there is a
“correct” amount of damages that would be awarded if the trier of fact were
omniscient, that is, possessed complete information regarding the material
facts of the claim and certainty about the governing law. 222 Further, for
simplicity, assume that the “correct” damages award would be the arithmetic
mean of the outcomes of an infinite number of adjudications of the claim
under different circumstances (e.g., different jurors, judges, lawyers,
presentations of evidence, etc.). 223 As explained in Aggregating for Accuracy,
because no trier of fact is omniscient, the trier of fact must arrive at an
estimate of the “correct” amount of damages. 224 We can then define error and
accuracy, respectively, in terms of the distance of an actual damages award
from, and the proximity of an actual damages award to, the “correct”
damages award. 225
Specifically, we can define error in terms of mean squared error
(“MSE”), which is a combination of bias and variance.226 Here, bias
represents “systematic error,” 227 or the difference between the “correct”
award and the expected award (i.e., the mean of the awards that would result
from infinite separate adjudications). For example, sampling evidence
220

509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (citation omitted).
Id.
222
Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 74–75; Bavli, supra note 218, at 209–10;
Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, at 833–34. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE
(1986) (describing “an imaginary judge [called Hercules] of superhuman intellectual power and
patience” who seeks to identify “the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal
practice,” id. at 239, 225). Alternatively, it can be assumed that there is a distribution of “correct”
damages awards that reflects, for example, incomplete information or uncertainty about the
governing law.
223
Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 74–75; Bavli, supra note 218, at 209–10;
Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, at 833–34. Various measures of central tendency can be used to
characterize the “correct” damages award. We use the arithmetic mean. Note that our assumption
that an award is “correct” on average is conservative in the sense that all changes in the magnitude
of a damages award caused by the introduction of sampling evidence are assumed to harm the
accuracy of the award—regardless whether such changes are in fact harmful or helpful in practice.
224
Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 74.
225
Id. at 74–75.
226
Id. at 81–83. More precisely, MSE is defined as the expectation of the squared differences
between the “correct” awards and the actual awards, which is equal to a combination of the
squared bias and variance. See Hillel J. Bavli, The Logic of Comparable-Case Guidance in the
Determination of Awards for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 15
(2017) [hereinafter The Logic of CCG] (defining MSE in the damages context).
227
See Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 240.
221
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introduces bias (under our assumptions) if it causes a change in the expected
magnitude of an award. Variance represents “random error,” or the dispersion
of awards around the mean award. 228 For example, sampling evidence
reduces the variance of an award if it would reduce the dispersion of repeated
adjudications of the corresponding claim. Finally, we can define accuracy as
the inverse of error: As error decreases, accuracy increases, and vice versa.
Consider again the factual circumstances in Tyson. Assume that we
selected a subclass of workers, and that a representative sample of videotaped
observations showed that their mean “donning” and “doffing” time was
eighteen minutes. If the damages awarded to each selected class member
were based on the assumption that each worker spent eighteen minutes each
day “donning” and “doffing” safety gear, each award would involve error
reflecting the difference between damages based on eighteen minutes and
damages based on the worker’s actual “donning” and “doffing” times. 229
The size of the error would depend, in part, on claim variability, that is,
the variability in all the workers’ claims for “donning” and “doffing” times in
excess of forty hours, because they took more or less than eighteen minutes to
perform these tasks. In addition, the error would depend on judgment
variability. For example, in Tyson, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ expert’s
calculations that supported an aggregate damages award of approximately
$6.7 million, the jury awarded classwide damages of about $2.9 million.230 A
different jury could have awarded the amount requested ($6.7 million), or $1
million, or some other amount. Judgment variability notwithstanding,
however, there are actual (“true”) “donning” and “doffing” times for each
class member. If the trier of fact were omniscient, the “correct” damages
would be awarded to each class member based on the “true” times. Therefore,
the error associated with using eighteen minutes “donning” and “doffing”
times to calculate individual damages results from both claim variability and
judgment variability. 231

228
The Logic of CCG, supra note 226, at 14–15; Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32
at 239–40 (“The standard deviation [square root of variance] is a sort of mean deviation from the
mean.”). Variance is defined more formally as the expectation of the squared differences between
the actual damages awards and the expected damages award. See The Logic of CCG, supra note
226, at 14–15. Note that our analysis does not rely on mean squared error as the definition of
error. We use mean squared error for computational and interpretational convenience, but
alternative measures of error could be used.
229
Keep in mind that we are still assuming that all class members have valid claims and are
entitled to damages awards because they worked more than forty hours in one or more weeks.
230
136 S. Ct. at 1044.
231
Note that, although we define the concept of a “correct” award for simplicity, our analysis
does not rely on the existence of a single “correct” award. See supra notes 222–225 and
accompanying text.
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E. Implications of Sampling for Accuracy and Reliability
Sampling impacts the error resulting from both forms of variability,
claim variability and judgment variability. For example, sampling can reduce
error resulting from judgment variability by aggregating information across
class members’ claims. 232 To illustrate, consider the effect of replication, or
multiple adjudications of the same individual claim:
Consider a costly procedure through which the outcome of a claim is
determined by averaging the verdicts resulting from ten independent
“replications” of the trial, or “repeated adjudications” (involving, for
example, different judges, juries, attorneys, presentations of
evidence, etc.). Assuming the outcome is relatively unbiased, it is
easy to show that following this procedure results in an accurate
outcome—an outcome that is close to the “correct” outcome.
Similarly, this procedure will produce an accurate outcome for each
claim of each member of a putative class (or subclass). Replication
thus increases the reliability of legal outcomes by reducing the error
caused by judgment variability. 233
Without doubt, a replication procedure would be costly. But, in a class of
identical, that is, homogeneous, claims, the full accuracy benefits of
replication could be realized by extrapolating damages awards based on a
representative sample of adjudicated claims to all non-adjudicated class
claims. 234 Moreover, the benefits of replication obtain whether the sampled
units are damages awards, or a determinative variable, such as “donning” and
“doffing” times. 235
The benefits of replication (and resulting aggregation of information
about class damages claims) can also be realized with heterogeneous class
damages claims. But, with heterogeneous claims, the accuracy benefits of
replication with respect to judgment variability must be balanced with the
introduction of error that results from applying a single aggregated value—for

232

See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 81–83; Saks & Blanck, supra note 200,
at 833–34.
233
Bavli, supra note 218, at 211; see also Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 77.
234
Bavli, supra note 218, at 211; see also Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 77.
Although a federal district court may extrapolate damages awards for non-sampled claims, it may
not, due to constitutional constraints and other reasons, replace adjudicated damages awards with
extrapolated damages awards. See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 78–81 (citing
cases); supra notes 62–64.
235
See infra notes 254–259 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of these
types of representative evidence (that is, representative evidence based on damages awards or
determinative variables) and the relationship between representative adjudications and
representative evidence.
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example, the mean of the damages awards from repeated adjudications—to a
class of variable claims that may have distinct “correct” outcomes. 236
Returning to a federal district court’s “gatekeeping” role under Daubert,
the admissibility of sampling evidence depends on whether the evidence is
reliable. Restated for present purposes, admissibility depends on whether
sampling evidence is “trustworthy” to prove individual damages. 237 We argue
here that evidentiary reliability is substantively equivalent to the concept of
reliability explicated in Sampling and Reliability in Class Action Litigation:
“[T]he reliability of a legal procedure [is] the accuracy of the legal outcome
that can be expected by following the procedure.”238 In particular, the
reliability of sampling evidence is based on its effect on the accuracy of the
individual damages awards. There is substantial support for this argument.
The Daubert Court emphasized that, “[i]n a case involving scientific
evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.” 239 And
scientific validity “refers to the ability of a test to measure what it is supposed
to measure—its accuracy.” 240
In this regard, the Reference Guide on Statistics and the Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence more generally discuss two components of
error—what can be considered as variance and bias—when assessing the
validity of a measurement.
First, the Reference Guide on Statistics highlights the important role of
scientific “reliability,” or consistency, in determining whether a measurement
is scientifically “valid,” 241 as well as the harmful effects of “random error” on
estimation, and statistical inference more generally.242 It describes two
different types of variability—“within-observer variability” and “betweenobserver variability”—as relevant to assessing whether a measurement is
scientifically reliable, and therefore whether the measurement is accurate.243
Applying these concepts to our analysis, and viewing adjudications of class
members’ claims as an estimation problem, they can be understood as
elements of judgment variability. A trier of fact adjudicating the same
236
Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 82–83; see also Bavli, supra note 218, at
212–14.
237
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
238
Bavli, supra note 218, at 210 (emphasis omitted).
239
509 U.S. at 590 n.9; see also Paul C. Giannelli et al., Reference Guide on Forensic
Identification Expertise, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 55, 71–72 (Federal
Judicial Center, 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise].
240
Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72; Reference
Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228 (“A valid measuring instrument measures what it is
supposed to.”); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (“[D]oes the principle support what it purports to
show?”).
241
Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 227–28; see also Reference Guide on
Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72.
242
Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 240–41.
243
See id. at 228.
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individual class member’s damages claim multiple times under different
circumstances may award different amounts of damages, representing
“within-observer variability.” In addition, different triers of fact adjudicating
the same claim under identical circumstances may determine different
damages awards, representing “between-observer variability.” Thus, when
viewed in this light, the concept of accuracy, or “scientific validity,” is based,
in part, on judgment variability. 244
Second, as explained in the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,
“[v]alidity includes [scientific] reliability, but the converse is not necessarily
true. Thus, a [scientifically] reliable, invalid technique will consistently yield
inaccurate results.”245 “In addition to reliability, validity is needed. A valid
measuring instrument measures what it is supposed to.” 246 Therefore, the
second component of validity, as described in the Reference Guide on
Statistics, can be understood as bias. Contrasting this type of error from
“random chance,” or “random error,” in the context of “inferences that may
be drawn from a study,” the Reference Guide on Statistics remarks, “[t]he
data might not address the issue of interest, might be systematically in error,
or might be difficult to interpret because of confounding. Statisticians would
group these concerns together under the rubric of ‘bias.’” 247
In sum, reliability of damages evidence can be evaluated in terms of its
effect on the accuracy of the damages award. By this standard, where
sampling evidence can be expected to improve accuracy, the evidence should
be considered reliable and therefore admissible.248

244

See Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72;
Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 227–28 (“A reliable measuring instrument returns
consistent measurements.”). As noted, “‘within-observer variability’ of judgments should be
small—the same evaluator should rate essentially identical cases in similar ways” and “‘betweenobserver variability’ should be small—different evaluators should rate the same cases in
essentially the same way.” Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228.
245
Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72; Reference
Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228 (“Reliability is necessary but not sufficient to ensure
accuracy.”).
246
Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228.
247
Id. at 240. The Reference Guide on Statistics also describes validity in terms of correlation,
which, similarly, can be stated in terms of bias and variance. See id. at 228 (“the polygraph is not
valid as a lie detector unless the measurements it makes are well correlated with lying”; “[a]
common measure of validity is the correlation coefficient between the predictor and the criterion
(e.g., test scores and later performance)”).
248
The expectation that sampling evidence improves accuracy is a sufficient but not a
necessary condition for improving reliability. Where sampling evidence cannot be expected to
improve accuracy, it does not necessarily follow that such evidence is not reliable. If sampling
evidence cannot be expected to improve accuracy (and, moreover, if it cannot be shown to be
expected to improve accuracy), this does not necessarily imply that such evidence is expected to
reduce accuracy.
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F. Threshold for Admissibility
Consider again circumstances similar to Tyson. Consider two scenarios:
one, sampling evidence is admitted to prove individual damages, or two, Rule
23(b)(3) class certification is denied (at least for purposes of individual
damages, but perhaps for liability and aggregate damages as well) and class
members’ individual damages claims must be separately adjudicated. In the
second scenario, we do not require that each class member actually proceed
with an individual adjudication. We only require that class certification is
denied and claims will be resolved by individual adjudications, if at all.
Our immediate goal is to derive threshold heterogeneity conditions, that
is, threshold claim variability conditions, under which sampling evidence is
admissible to prove individual damages for all class members’ damages
claims. We focus on the admissibility of the average of damages awarded for
sampled claims, or the average of other operative values, such as “donning”
and “doffing” times in Tyson, in sampled claims. Specifically, we focus on the
admissibility of the mean of such values, which we call the “sample mean.”
We are seeking conditions under which sampling evidence improves
accuracy, notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the claims. In short, we want
to know the values of claim variability for which sampling evidence can be
said “to measure what it is supposed to measure,” ensuring its scientific
validity and thus its evidentiary reliability. 249 Below, we show that this
threshold is the value at which claim variability equals judgment variability.
We conclude that using sampling evidence, and specifically the sample mean,
to estimate the damages for each claim of a heterogeneous class improves
accuracy when judgment variability exceeds claim variability.
G. Hierarchical Model
Let us consider the problem in more formal terms. Assume that the
damages award for a claim 𝑖𝑖, call it 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , is statistically distributed with mean
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and variance 𝜎𝜎 2 , for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . 𝑁𝑁. Notationally, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ~(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , 𝜎𝜎 2 ). 250 This
simply means that each of the 𝑁𝑁 claims will equal its “correct” award, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , on
average, but that the award involves some degree of randomness or judgment
variability, 𝜎𝜎 2 . 251 Furthermore, to reflect the fact that the claims are related
(as required to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2) commonality), assume that the “correct”
awards for the claims, the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ’s, are distributed with a “global” mean 𝜇𝜇 and
249
Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72; Reference
Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
250
See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 81–83; The Logic of CCG, supra note
226, at 15–18.
251
See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 81–83; The Logic of CCG, supra note
226, at 15–18.
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variance 𝜏𝜏 2 . Notationally, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ~(𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏 2 ). 252 In other words, the “correct”
damages awards for the claims will equal the global mean, or 𝜇𝜇, on average,
but display some degree of variability, 𝜏𝜏 2 , that is, claim variability. This
recognizes the fact that the claims may differ substantively and involve
distinct “correct” awards. 253
This model, known in statistics as a standard two-level hierarchical (or
multilevel) model, allows for a very general methodology with few
assumptions regarding the damages awards. The statistical model is depicted
in Figure 1 below. 254

Figure 1. Image of hierarchical model with lower level 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ~(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , 𝜎𝜎 2 ) and upper level
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ~ (𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏 2 ). Note that the shape and size of the distributions are for illustrative purposes only
and are not drawn to scale. For example, the distributions are not necessarily “normal,” or in
the shape of a bell curve, and the dispersion, or variance, of the lower level distributions are not
necessarily less than that of the upper level. The points at the bottom of the lower-level
distributions represent possible values of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , reflecting the respective means of each claim 𝑖𝑖 and
judgment variability 𝜎𝜎 2 .

Now, let us temporarily simplify the problem through abstraction for
purposes of deriving an appropriate threshold. We are interested in
measuring, or estimating, the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ’s (“correct” damages awards). We want to
know for what values of claim variability, 𝜏𝜏 2 , would applying the mean, 𝑋𝑋�𝑛𝑛 ,
of a random sample of 𝑛𝑛 claims from a total of N claims, rather than

252
See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 81–83; The Logic of CCG, supra note
226, at 15–18.
253
See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 81–83; The Logic of CCG, supra note
226, at 15–18.
254
This graphic is available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/lawreview-content/BCLR/59-2/bavli-felter-graphics-A1b.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ63-4VTG].
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individual damages awards, improve accuracy, where the criterion for
accuracy is MSE (summed over N).
Importantly, this framework applies whether the sampled units are
damages awards—see, for example, discussions of Cimino (involving
representative adjudications) and Hilao (involving representative evidence),
supra Part I—or, as in Tyson, a variable that is determinative of the damages
awards. 255 In Tyson, for example, the sample “donning” and “doffing” times
may be converted to damages awards (or vice versa) by applying a constant
multiplier, that is, 150% of the hourly wage for each hour worked in excess of
forty hours each week.

255
Bavli, supra note 218, at 217–18; see Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 767
(9th Cir. 1996); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Tex. 1990); cf. Tyson,
136 S. Ct. at 1041. Sampling and Reliability in Class Action Litigation explains the relationship
between representative evidence and representative adjudications as follows:

[I]n Aggregating for Accuracy, an award in a heterogeneous class is modeled
hierarchically: the “correct” awards in the class are distributed around some global
mean, whereas each actual award is “drawn” from a distribution around each claim’s
“correct” award. The former distribution represents claim variability, whereas the
latter distribution represents judgment variability. In a homogeneous class,
replication offers accuracy benefits by providing additional information regarding
the “correct” award associated with the replicated claim, which otherwise would be
obscured by judgment variability. In a heterogeneous class, sampling offers
accuracy benefits, with respect to a certain claim, not by providing information
regarding that claim’s “correct” award directly, but by providing information
regarding the global mean around which all of the “correct” awards are distributed,
and thereby regarding the “correct” award for the subject claim indirectly. Similarly,
representative evidence, such as the type in dispute in Tyson Foods (where, for
example, the sample reflects variability of measured donning and doffing times
rather than judgment variability), offers accuracy benefits, with respect to a certain
claim, by providing information regarding the global mean around which the
“correct” awards are distributed, and thereby regarding the “correct” award for that
claim in particular. Another way of understanding this is through “comparable-case
guidance” (CCG) methods, whereby a court uses information regarding awards in
prior comparable cases as guidance for a fact-finder’s determination of damages.
The Logic of CCG examines the statistical mechanism by which CCG affects
awards, and the conditions under which such evidence will improve accuracy. In
particular, the paper explains that, under certain mild behavioral assumptions, the
risk that such evidence would reduce accuracy—that error resulting from claim
variability and bias would outweigh the accuracy benefits of reducing judgment
variability—is minimal. Like CCG, representative evidence provides information
regarding the distribution of “correct” awards for comparable claims, including the
global mean, and, in turn, about the “correct” award for the subject claim.
Bavli, supra note 218, at 218 n.67 (citations omitted). In addition, our model can be extended to
representative evidence that is not immediately determinative of the claims’ damages awards.
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Thus, let us derive the claim variability conditions, that is, the values of
𝜏𝜏 , that yield greater accuracy when applying the sample mean, 𝑋𝑋�𝑛𝑛 , to all
claims, rather than an individual outcome, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , to each claim 𝑖𝑖:256
2

The converse can be shown to be true as well. Thus, given a sufficiently
large sample, the error resulting from individual outcomes is greater than the
error resulting from the sample mean (see Line (1)), if and only if, the lowerlevel variance 𝜎𝜎 2 (judgment variability) is greater than the upper-level
variance 𝜏𝜏 2 (claim variability) (see Line (4)). 257 In other words, using the
sample mean (the mean of awards for sampled class members’ damages
claims) rather than individual outcomes (separate adjudications) results in
greater accuracy, if and only if, judgment variability is greater than claim
variability. Furthermore, conversely, assuming a reasonable sample size—
which we will assume for the remainder of Part IV—if judgment variability is
greater than claim variability, using the sample mean, rather than individual
outcomes, improves accuracy.
This result is intuitive. The accuracy benefit associated with the use of
the sample mean arises from the sharing of information across claims.
Information sharing reduces the error caused by judgment variability. On the
other hand, using the sample mean, rather than individual outcomes, gives
rise to error resulting from applying a single point estimate to variable claims.
By applying one value, albeit a value that benefits from information sharing,
to heterogeneous claims that involve distinct “correct” awards, necessarily
introduces error.

256
This graphic is available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/lawreview-content/BCLR/59-2/bavli-felter-graphics-A1b.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ63-4VTG].
257
As shown in the derivation (Line (3)), the necessary sample size will depend on the values
of judgment variability and claim variability. However, if the estimated judgment variability is
greater than the estimated claim variability, see infra notes 267–277 and accompanying text, a
moderately-sized random sample would generally suffice to satisfy standards of reliability. Note,
we could alternatively derive this result using certain additional assumptions.
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Consider again the image in Figure 1, including the scale of the
distributions, which would occur if judgment variability were far lower than
claim variability. In that circumstance, there is little to gain from information
sharing, because the individual outcomes are likely to approximate their
respective “correct” awards. On the other hand, because claim variability is
relatively high, using the sample mean would result in a high degree of error
arising from the application of a single point estimate to very heterogeneous
claims. However, if the lower-level distributions in Figure 1 were larger (i.e.,
involving greater variance) than the upper-level distribution—that is, if
judgment variability were greater than claim variability—then there would be
significant gain from information sharing (via the sample mean), which could
eliminate significant error caused by random variation, or judgment
variability. And, because claim variability would be relatively low, there
would be relatively little error arising from applying a single point estimate to
the relatively low-variability (although still heterogeneous) claims.
To summarize, when judgment variability exceeds claim variability,
applying sampling evidence, and particularly the sample mean, rather than
individual outcomes (whether damages awards or, for example, “donning”
and “doffing” times) to estimate the “correct” damages awards improves
accuracy. Improving accuracy increases evidentiary reliability. In these
circumstances, therefore, using sampling evidence improves evidentiary
reliability.
It is axiomatic that evidence proving individual damages can be relied
on to establish damages in an individual action. When sampling evidence—
and a properly calculated sample mean in particular—improves accuracy, and
hence reliability, it is admissible in an individual action. In short, the sample
mean “could have been sufficient to sustain a jury finding . . . if it were
introduced in . . . [an] individual action.”258 It is, therefore, admissible in a
class action.
Our analysis does not rely on how a trier of fact will actually be
influenced by expert sampling evidence. We simply adopt the standard for
evidentiary reliability, which is based on scientific validity, to answer the
questions: “[D]oes the principle support what it purports to show?” 259 Does it
“measure what it is supposed to measure?” 260 The foregoing analysis answers
each of these questions with a resounding “yes”—when judgment variability
is greater than claim variability.
It is noteworthy that the above hierarchical model and related analysis
involve minimal assumptions regarding class members’ damages awards and
material evidence (e.g., “donning” and “doffing” times), and are generally
258

Tyson, 135 S. Ct. at 1048.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
260
Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72; Reference
Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228.
259
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accepted statistical methods that easily satisfy Daubert standards and Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 criteria. For example, the model and methodology have
“general acceptance,” “can be (and ha[ve] been) tested,” and have been
“subjected to peer review and publication.”261 Moreover, expert testimony
based on them would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence” and
would be “the product of reliable principles and methods,” in compliance
with Rule 702. 262
H. Correlation
The above analysis can be restated in terms of correlation, which is
among the most generally accepted methods in statistics and the sciences
generally. 263
For example, in Tyson, consider the correlation between the “correct”
damages awards for individual class members’ claims (independent variable),
or, instead, the true “donning” and “doffing” times, and actual damages
awards (dependent variable). Imagine a graph with the independent variable
on the x-axis and the dependent variable on the y-axis, as depicted in the
graphs in Figure 2 below. The variability of the data points would reflect the
two types of variability we have been discussing—judgment variability and
claim variability. The trier of fact does not know the “correct” damages
awards but can estimate them based on the evidence introduced at trial.
Therefore, there is generally a correlation between “correct” damages awards
and actual damages awards (or, equivalently, “true” “donning” and “doffing”
times and actual damages awards).
But there is also judgment variability, or random variation. If judgment
variability is high relative to claim variability, then the correlation would not
be apparent. In particular, the estimate of the correlation coefficient, the value
that represents the strength of the relationship between the two variables,
would be close to zero, and would likely be found “insignificant,” with a high
p-value, in the context of a hypothesis test. 264 If claim variability were large
relative to judgment variability, however, the correlation would be apparent,
261

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
FED. R. EVID. 702. Significantly, the hierarchical model and derivation of the foregoing
threshold standard for admissibility are abstracted from any specific legal circumstances. This
elucidates their general acceptance and tested reliability, without confusion caused by context.
Furthermore, the concepts explained, such as judgment variability and claim variability, have
strong foundations in the literature (not to mention case law), and meet the requirements of
Daubert and Rule 702. See generally, Cheng, supra note 204, at 955; Saks & Blanck, supra note
200, at 833–37.
263
See, e.g., Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 227–28 (“[g]iven independence,
the correlation coefficient . . . between repeated measurements can be used as a measure of
reliability”; “[a] common measure of validity is the correlation coefficient between the predictor
and the criterion”).
264
See supra notes 113–128 and accompanying text.
262
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and the estimated correlation coefficient would likely be found
“significant.”265
Graph A

Graph B

Graph C

Figure 2. Comparison of correlation between “correct,” or “true,” damages awards and actual
damages awards at different levels of judgment variability.

Consider, for example, the graphs in Figure 2.266 Graph A displays
circumstances in which judgment variability is low relative to claim
variability, and a correspondingly clear and strong correlation. Graph B
displays circumstances in which judgment variability is closer to the value of
265

See supra notes 113–128 and accompanying text.
This graphic is available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/lawreview-content/BCLR/59-2/bavli-felter-graphics-A1b.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ63-4VTG].
266
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claim variability, and a correspondingly possible—although weak, if any—
correlation. Graph C displays circumstances in which judgment variability
exceeds claim variability, and a correspondingly zero or negligible
correlation. The graphs in Figure 2 illustrate that it may be possible for
putative class plaintiffs to argue, using hypothesis testing or confidence
intervals, that, if there is no clear correlation between the dependent and
independent variables, suggesting that judgment variability exceeds claim
variability, then the sampling evidence improves accuracy and satisfies
evidentiary criteria for reliability and admissibility.
This approach is effectively a form of statistical “model testing.” The
model being tested involves “group means”—or individual outcomes—which
would be advantageous (with respect to accuracy) if there were a significant
correlation. The alternative model is based on the “sample mean,” where all
values of the independent variable are assumed to be associated with the same
value—the sample mean—of the dependent variable.
Of course, it is impossible to know the “correct” damages awards. But,
reliable estimates can be derived through sampling. For example, in
circumstances similar to those in Tyson, the independent variable on the xaxis could be replaced with estimated damages awards based on the
“donning” and “doffing” times observed in the sample. Plaintiffs may be able
to use such estimates to demonstrate their argument in terms of correlation.267
So far, we have not generally addressed how to estimate relevant model
parameters, such as judgment variability and claim variability. Below, we
offer recommendations.
I. Estimating Claim Variability and Judgment Variability
We have argued that, whether sampling evidence is reliable and
therefore admissible to prove individual damages depends on claim
variability and judgment variability. These variability parameters can be
understood as having “true” fixed values. And, although it is impossible to
ascertain their “true” values, it is possible to calculate reliable estimates. 268
J. Claim Variability and Samples
Claim variability can often be estimated from the selected sample itself.
For example, in wage and hour cases such as Tyson, the variability of class
members’ damages claims frequently arises from a single variable, a single
characteristic of the claims. This is true when the facts underlying one
characteristic of the individual claims constitute the only facts that distinguish
267
Note that, for correlation-based methods, because putative class plaintiffs have the burden
of proving that their proffered evidence is reliable, it may be insufficient to perform a standard
hypothesis test using a significance level of .05.
268
Bavli, supra note 218, at 209.
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one claim from another; or because the court (e.g., by rulings or orders) or the
parties (e.g., by stipulations) have narrowed the disputed material facts to one
case-dispositive variable. 269 In Tyson, the only characteristic of the class
members’ claims that varied, with respect to damages, was the amount of
time spent “donning” and “doffing” safety gear. In such “unidimensional”
cases, a representative sample of claims can provide a reliable estimate of
claim variability. For example, the claim variability of the damages claims
among the workers in the “cut and retrim” departments could be estimated by
measuring the variance of the “donning” and “doffing” times in the
representative sample of workers in those departments. Or, more concretely
(and to facilitate comparison to judgment variability), claim variability could
be estimated by measuring the variance of statutory damages based on those
times.
Admittedly, some cases are ill-suited for this type of variance
measurement. For example, Title VII employment discrimination cases
frequently require analyses of numerous characteristics of each class
member’s damages claim and involve too many variables (e.g., race, sex,
education, job classification, seniority, etc.) to permit a reliable estimate of
claim variability.
On the other hand, it may be possible to compute reliable claim
variability estimates even in cases where claim variability depends on more
than one characteristic of class members’ claims. In circumstances similar to
those in Tyson, “donning” and “doffing” times of the sampled workers could
be used to compute damages awards, and to estimate claim variability in
terms of damages awards. But, Tyson is also an example of a case where
claim variability depends on two variables. Specifically, if we now eliminate
the assumption that all class members had valid claims and were entitled to
damages, then damages, in a sense, depend on two variables: “donning” and
“doffing” times and whether (for each additional incremental unit of time) a
class member worked more than forty hours in the week. 270 Claim variability
can be estimated directly from the sample by aggregating these variables and
considering the total amount of “donning” and “doffing” times exceeding
forty hours of work each week. 271
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We are still assuming that all class members have valid claims and are entitled to damages.
See supra notes 25–45 and accompanying text.
271
Note, to compute damages, the times in excess of forty hours in a week could be
multiplied by the statutorily-prescribed overtime rate (i.e., 150% of hourly wages). One might
think that, if it is possible to calculate damages based on a statute or other prescribed formula,
judgment variability must be low or zero. This is not necessarily so. In Tyson, the jury awarded
classwide damages of about $2.9 million, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ expert’s formulaic
calculations, based on the governing statute, supporting aggregate damages of approximately $6.7
million. 136 S. Ct. at 1044. This disparity can likely be attributed to a number of factors. The point
is, however, that multiple independent adjudications could result in variable outcomes.
270
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By extension, it may be possible to apply standard statistical methods to
compute a reliable estimate even in cases where claim variability depends on
multiple characteristics of class members’ claims.
K. Judgment Variability and “Test Cases”
Judgment variability, on the other hand, cannot be estimated from the
sample directly. Although it may be theoretically possible to isolate and
quantify the characteristics of class members’ claims that would affect
individual damages, judgment variability measures the dispersion of the
individual damages awards, given the particular facts of each individual
claim. Judgment variability reflects the variability of damages awards that
would be observed by adjudicating a single claim multiple times, or the
variability associated with the damages awards that is not attributable to
substantive differences among the individual claims (i.e., that is not
attributable to claim variability). Therefore, an obvious approach to
estimating judgment variability contemplates the use of “test cases,” and
specifically, replication.
For example, if a single claim is adjudicated multiple times, the resulting
damages awards can be used to estimate judgment variability for that claim
and other substantively similar claims. 272 Alternatively, if claim variability
can be estimated, then a sample of claims can be adjudicated and claim
variability subtracted from the total variability to estimate judgment
variability. Thus, a robust method for estimating judgment variability is
through the adjudication of “test cases,” where a representative sample of
class members’ claims are adjudicated either by trials or alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) procedures.
If judgment variability is unlikely to change significantly from claim to
claim (which, as suggested, will often occur), then judgment variability can
be determined relatively efficiently by adjudicating one “representative”
claim before numerous triers of fact. Each trier of fact can observe the
proceedings in a separate observation room, or together in a single room but
then deliberate separately. In circumstances similar to those in Tyson, a
“representative” claim based on average “donning” and “doffing” times can
be selected for adjudication (perhaps following streamlined procedures
presided over by magistrate judges or court-appointed special masters) before
numerous triers of fact—say, five to ten separate juries of six. Each trier of
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It is not necessary that the claims be identical. It is likely that judgment variability is
relatively similar across substantively similar claims, such as those in a class or subclass. For
example, it is unlikely that the judgment variability associated with a claim in Tyson based on
“donning” and “doffing” times of eighteen minutes is significantly different from that associated
with a claim based on “donning” and “doffing” times of twenty-two minutes.
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fact can arrive independently at a damages award, and the variability of the
awards can be used to estimate judgment variability.
This “test case” procedure captures some, but not all, sources of
judgment variability. Adopting the language of the Reference Guide on
Statistics, this procedure focuses on “between-observer variability” rather
than “within-observer variability,” because the claim is adjudicated only once
by each “observer,” that is, each trier of fact.273 This procedure may capture
certain aspects of “within-observer variability,” but, in any event, omits
certain significant sources of judgment variability, such as variations in the
presentations of evidence. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the procedure is
relatively inexpensive and convenient. Furthermore, to the extent that it does
not capture certain sources of judgment variability, the calculation of
judgment variability will be, if anything, conservative—that is, it will
understate judgment variability.
Of course, the “test case” procedure can be modified to suit the
circumstances of each case. A more accurate, but more costly, method to
determine judgment variability is to adjudicate a selected claim multiple
times before multiple triers of fact. In certain cases, it may be beneficial to
adopt the “test case” procedure for subclasses where subclassification is
capable of neutralizing a major source of claim variability and thereby
stabilizing, or making relatively consistent, judgment variability within each
subclass.274
A more robust procedure involves selecting a “representative” sample of
claims for adjudications. Each sampled claim can be adjudicated multiple
times (again, perhaps following streamlined procedures presided over by
magistrate judges or court-appointed special masters) to determine judgment
variability for each claim. These determinations can then be “aggregated”
(e.g., by averaging) to estimate judgment variability for the claims in the
entire class (or subclass). This procedure is costly, but it captures various
sources of judgment variability and is more robust to variations in judgment
variability across class claims.
In another alternative, each claim in a “representative” sample of claims
can be adjudicated once, the variability of the resulting damages awards can
be computed, and the claim variability subtracted from the result. This
procedure may be less costly than adjudicating each claim multiple times, but
it captures fewer sources of judgment variability and relies on the accuracy of
the claim variability computation.
In any event, if class plaintiffs wish to present expert testimony
regarding a correlation analysis similar to that described earlier, they may
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See Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228.
See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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propose a procedure to adjudicate multiple claims multiple times. 275 To
determine whether judgment variability exceeds claim variability in a case
similar to Tyson, a federal district court can adjudicate “representative” claims
at different “donning” and “doffing” times, each multiple times. For
example, the court can try a “typical” claim involving five minutes “donning”
and “doffing” times, ten minutes “donning” and “doffing” times, fifteen
minutes “donning” and doffing” times, and so on, each adjudication using
multiple (e.g., four to six) juries of six. This way, the resulting damages
awards would capture both claim variability (reflecting different times) and
judgment variability (reflecting different outcomes by different triers of fact);
and plaintiffs can use the resulting data to test hypotheses or derive
confidence intervals related to the relevant correlation coefficients. In Figure
2, sample “donning” and “doffing” times can be used as estimates of “true”
“donning” and “doffing” times for the independent variable on the x-axis and
damages awards can be used as the dependent variable on the y-axis, thus
allowing the possibility of correlation-based arguments.
The basic point is that “test cases,” and specifically replication, can be
used (with varying levels of costs) to arrive at reliable estimates of judgment
variability and claim variability, as well as other values, such as relevant
correlation coefficients. The procedures are not mutually exclusive and can be
tailored to the circumstances of each class action.
Furthermore, a federal district court can reduce the costs of determining
damages awards for sampled class members by lowering the required
judgment variability threshold so that relatively inexpensive methods (such as
adjudicating a single claim before numerous triers of fact) can be used
notwithstanding less accurate, but conservative (if anything), results. Under
certain circumstances, a court can subclassify, or “stratify,” a class to
neutralize, or “control for,” sources of claim variability, and then sample—
and eventually award individual damages—within each subclass. 276 These
procedures can be employed to obtain relatively (or at least moderately)
homogeneous subclasses, so that detection of a relatively low level of
judgment variability would be sufficient to confidently conclude that
judgment variability exceeds claim variability within a subclass,
notwithstanding a less costly estimation procedure.
Additionally, in some cases, even where class members’ damages claims
are heterogeneous, a federal district court, acting as the finder of fact, could
find that certain variability is immaterial, rendering the claims less variable (or
even homogeneous). In circumstances similar to those in Tyson, for example, a
court can find that a large number of workers in the “cut and retrim”
departments had “donning” and “doffing” times of approximately twenty
275
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See supra notes 263–267 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5). See generally supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
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minutes, and that workers who spent more time “donning” and “doffing”
safety gear were not deserving of additional compensation. In such cases—and
particularly in cases in which the court’s findings reduce claim variability
significantly—less costly estimation procedures are even more feasible.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decision in Tyson revitalized the role of sampling in
class actions. The Tyson Court analyzed sampling as an evidentiary issue and
unanimously ruled that sampling evidence is a permissible method to prove
classwide claims if it is shown “that each class member could have relied on”
the evidence in an individual action.277 To paraphrase the Tyson Court, when
class members are “similarly situated,” there is a “role for representative
evidence,” in both individual and class adjudications.278 When class members
are “similarly situated,” “experiences of a subset of [class members] can be
probative as to the experiences of all of them.” 279 And, in such cases, a “just
and reasonable” inference can be drawn from the sampling evidence to prove
a claim of each class member. 280
After Tyson, federal courts have understandably been more receptive to
plaintiffs’ efforts to introduce sampling evidence to prove classwide liability,
and occasionally aggregate damages, in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. This is an
important development because sampling is often the only practicable method
to prove classwide liability and damages and still satisfy the predominance
prerequisite of the Rule. Yet, federal courts continue to refuse to certify
individual damages issues because they find that individual issues, especially
the calculations of individual damages, defeat the predominance of common
issues.
In this Article, after examining a brief bleak history of sampling
evidence in federal court class actions, we analyzed the law governing the
admissibility of expert evidence and the certification of Rule 23(b)(3)
damages class actions. As we explained, the admissibility of sampling
evidence depends on its relevance and, most importantly, its reliability. We
demonstrated how sampling evidence can satisfy Daubert and Rule 702
standards and the prerequisites for Rule 23(b)(3) classes.
While being careful to comply with these standards and prerequisites,
we developed a method and derived a threshold to determine whether class
damages claims are sufficiently homogeneous to justify the admissibility of
sampling evidence to prove individual damages.
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136 S. Ct. at 1046–47; see supra notes 10–82 and accompanying text.
136 S. Ct. at 1048.
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Id.
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Id. (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946)).
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We argued that accuracy is an appropriate standard for evidentiary
reliability. We then introduced two defined terms, judgment variability and
claim variability, and, employing generally accepted statistical methods, we
demonstrated that, when judgment variability exceeds claim variability,
sampling evidence improves accuracy and evidentiary reliability, and therefore
is admissible to prove individual damages. Finally, we recommended several
procedures to evaluate whether damages claims of a putative class satisfy the
derived threshold.
In conclusion, we argue that our proposed method to prove individual
damages achieves the goals of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, as stated by the
Supreme Court. Federal courts and parties that follow the proposed method
will realize “economies of time, effort, and expense.” 281 And, the proposed
method promotes “uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated,
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable
results.” 282

281

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23
advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment).
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